The investigation of the nature of the soul requires that we should not only raise difficulties on questions that require settlement; we should also, after we have gone so far, collect the views of those who have previously stated their opinions on the subject: and this in order that we may at once adopt whatever is correctly stated, and also be on our guard against anything that may be the reverse.
The beginning of such an enquiry must be to set forth those characteristics which are generally regarded as the natural attributes of the soul.
Now there are two points particularly in which the animate or soul-endowed is thought to differ from the inanimate or soulless — viz. motion and sensation.
And these are in fact about the two characteristics of soul which our predecessors have handed down to us.
There are some who maintain that fundamentally and primarily the soul is the principle of movement.
They reasoned that that which is not itself in motion cannot move anything else, and thus they regarded the soul as one of those objects which were in motion.
Democritus, whose view agrees with that of Leucippus, consequently maintained soul to be a sort of fire and heat.
For as the forms of the atoms are as the atoms themselves unlimited, he declares that those which are spherical in shape constitute fire and soul, these atoms being like the so-called motes which are seen in the sunbeams that enter through doorways, and it is in such a mixed heap of seeds that he finds the elements of the whole natural world.
The reason why they maintain that the spherical atoms constitute the soul, is that atoms of such configuration are best able to penetrate through everything, and to set the other things in motion at the same time as they are moved themselves, the assumption here being that the soul is that which supplies animals with motion.
This same assumption led them to regard respiration as the boundary with which life was coterminous.
It was, they held, the tendency of the encircling atmosphere to cause contraction in the animal body and to expel those atomic forms, which, from never being at rest themselves, supply animals with movement.
This tendency however was counteracted by the reinforcement derived from the entrance from outside in the act of respiration of new atoms of a similar kind.
These last in fact — such was their theory — as they united to repel the compressing and solidifying forces prevented those atoms already existing in animals from being expelled from them: and life, they thought, continued so long as there was strength to carry on this process.
The doctrine ascribed to the Pythagoreans seems also to have this same meaning.
Some of them maintained that the soul was the motes within the air, others held that it was what put them in motion.
Such motes have been employed to describe the soul, because they present the appearance of continual movement, even though there be a perfect calm.
Similar to the opinion which has just been stated is that which describes the soul as something which sets itself in motion: this and all other like definitions seeming to regard movement as the most distinctive characteristic of the soul.
All other things, the supporters of these views imply, are moved in virtue of their soul, but soul is moved by itself; a conclusion which is explained by the observation that nothing is found to produce movement without at the same time moving itself.
Anaxagoras, in like manner, describes mind as the principle of movement: and this indeed must be the account given of it also by any other philosopher who maintains that reason set the universe in motion.
Anaxagoras, however, did not regard soul in this light so completely as did Democritus.
The latter absolutely identified soul and reason, holding as he did that that which presented itself to sense was real truth: so that (he observed) Homer had well sung of Hector as lying 'with thought apart.'
Democritus, this shews, does not employ the term reason to denote a faculty conversant with truth, but uses reason as identical with soul.
Anaxagoras himself, however, is less distinct in his identification of the terms.
In many places he speaks of reason as the cause of what is beautiful and right, but in other passages he seems to place it on a level with the soul, as when for instance he maintains that it is present in all animals both great and small, both honourable and dishonourable.
As matter of fact, however, reason, in the sense of intellect and insight, does not seem to be present equally in all animals or even indeed in all men.
Those then, who have concentrated their attention on the fact that what is animate is in motion have regarded soul as that which is most capable of movement: those thinkers, on the other hand, who have directed their observations to the fact that the soul knows and perceives things existing, identify soul with the elementary principles of all existence, some making those principles to be several in number, others resolving them into this one principle of soul.
Thus Empedocles makes the soul to be composed of all the elements, and at the same time considers each one of these elements a soul.
His words are as follows:
“Surely by earth we perceive earth, and man knoweth water by water.
By air sees air the divine; by fire sees fire the destructive: Yea, love comprehends love, and 'tis through strife dismal we know strife."
In this same fashion also does Plato in the Timaeus construct the soul out of the elements.
Like, he there maintains, is known by like, and the objects of knowledge are composed of the elements of existence.
To the same effect also is the distinction drawn in his lectures on philosophy, where it is shown that on the one hand the generic or abstract form of the living subject is a product containing the abstract form ' of unity with the primary phase of length and breadth and I depth: and that on the other hand other things are formed in a corresponding manner.
An additional mode of explanation is to represent reason as perfect unity, understanding as the two (because it proceeds like a single line directly in one way to one conclusion only), whereas opinion is represented as the number of a superficies, and sense perception as the number of a solid.
Numbers, in fact, were said by the Platonists to be the very forms and principles of existence: and such numbers are formed from the elements.
And things are apprehended — some by rea son, others by understanding, a third class by opinion, and * fourth order by sense: while the numbers, to which these faculties correspond, constitute the forms or ideas of things themselves.
Since, moreover, the soul was held to be at once a faculty for movement and a faculty for knowledge in this numerical sense: there have been thinkers who have combined the two descriptions and have set forth the soul as a self-moving number.
While however these thinkers agree in reducing the soul to elements or principles, they differ as regards the name and number of the principles: a difference which prevails especially between those who make the principles corporeal, and those who make them incorporeal, and also between both of these and such thinkers as have blended and exhibited their principles as compounded from both sources.
They differ too about the number of their principles, some reducing them to one, others regarding them as more in number.
There is a corresponding variation in their views about the soul.
The principle of movement they, not unreasonably, regarded as one of the primary elements in the natural world: and consequently there were some who viewed the mind as fire, this being that one among the elements which is made up of the finest parts and is most incorporeal, while further it is the element which is the first to be moved itself and to move other things.
The reason for each of these facts Democritus has expressed somewhat neatly.
Soul he regarded as identical with reason, and this he held belonged to the class of primary and indivisible bodies, and possessed the faculty of movement by reason of the smallness of its parts and of its peculiar form.
Now the form which is most susceptible of movement is the spherical: and of such shape is reason and fire.
Anaxagoras, on the other hand, might, as we have said before, sometimes be taken to speak of soul and reason as different from one another: but he really uses the two terms as fundamentally one in nature, with the exception that he makes reason generally the principle of all things.
He says at least that * it alone among existing things is simple and unmixed and pure/ At the same time he assigns to one and the same principle both faculties — both knowledge and movement — in saying as he does that reason moved the universe.
Similarly also Thales, from what is related of him, seems to have regarded soul as something with capacity of movement, if it be the case that he spoke of the loadstone as possessing soul because it moves iron.
On the other hand Diogenes as also some others resolved soul into air, supposing that this was the subtlest of all things and, at the same time, a principle of existence.
This also, they said, was the reason of the knowledge and of the movement of the soul; the faculty of knowledge falling to it as primary and as that out of which all other things are compounded, that of movement belonging to it as being of the subtlest nature.
Heraclitus also identifies the soul with his principle in describing it as the " fiery process " out of which he derives other existing things, his ground being that it is that which is least corporeal and in constant movement.
He believed in fact with the many that the objects of existence were in continual movement, and the moved, he argued, could be known only by means of the moved.
Alcmaeon too seems to have held similar views about the nature of the soul.
The soul, he says, is immortal because it is like the immortal: and it is so because it is in everlasting movement, while all things divine — moon, sun, stars and the whole heaven — are for ever in such everlasting movement.
Among cruder thinkers there have been some such as Hippo who have even described the soul as water.
This belief seems to have been suggested to them by generative seed which in all animals is moist — Hippo in fact argues against those who assert that the soul is blood on the very ground that the seed is not blood — and this seed they regarded as the primary form of soul.
Others again, like Critias, have identified the soul with blood, regarding sentiency as the most distinctive characteristic of the soul and viewing this sensient capacity as due to the element of blood.
Thus, With the one exception of the earth, all the elements have gained a vote.
The earth however has been adduced by no one except indeed in such cases as some thinker has explained the soul as formed from all the elements or has actually identified it with them all.
Each in fact of the three attributes which we may say are generally used to characterise the soul — movement, perception and incorporeal existence — is supposed to characterize the principles of being.
And for this very reason all those who define soul by its capacity for knowledge make it either an element or one of the elements, using (with the exception of one of their number) almost identical expressions respecting it.
Like, in short, they say, is known by like; and since the soul knows all things, they constitute it out of all the elements.
Thus then those thinkers who admit only some one cause and some one element identify the soul also with some one thing such as fire or air: those, on the other hand, who regard the primary elements of existence as more than one, resolve the soul also into several such elements.
Anaxagoras alone says that the reason is not subject to modification from without and has nothing in common with anything beside itself.
How being such it is to acquire knowledge and why this is so is a subject on which Anaxagoras has said nothing, nor does the general tenour of his writings help to make it plain.
As many further as posit opposites among their primary elements of being constitute the soul also out of contraries; while those who maintain the one or other among contraries—: as for example hot or cold or something of this character — resolve the soul also in a corresponding manner into some one or other of these elements.
Hence further such thinkers follow etymologies: some maintaining soul to be the *hot' because it is from the name of heating or 'seething' that the word to live is etymologically derived: others holding soul to be the 'cold' because it is from respiration and cooling that the word for soul has been constructed.
Such then are the opinions which have been handed down respecting soul, as also the grounds on which they rest.