De Anima

Aristotle · edition credit: Edwin Wallace

Book 3, reading section 6

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With regard then to the exercise of reason, the thinking of isolated single terms falls within a sphere in which there is no falsity: when, on the other hand, we find both falsity and truth, there we reach a certain combination of ideas as constituting one conception: much in the same way as Empedocles said: " Thereupon many there were whose heads grew up neckless entirely:" but were afterwards brought together by friendship.

In a corresponding fashion is it that those notions which are originally separate are afterwards connected, as is, for instance, the case with the two notions incommensurate and diagonal.

Should the notions in question be, however, related to the past or to the future, thought then adds on the idea of time to that of mere connection.

Falsehood, in fact, always involves combination and connection: even in asserting the white to be not white we bring not-white into a combination.

It should be added, at the same time, that all this process might be described, not as combination, but rather as disjunction or division.

Anyhow it follows that truth or falsehood is not limited to saying that "Cleon is white," but includes the judgment that he was or will be: and the process of thus reducing our ideas into the unity of a single judgment is in each case the work of reason.

Further light is thrown upon this unity of thought by considering that the indivisible and continuous presents itself before us in two forms, either as potential or as actual.

There is therefore nothing to prevent us conceiving extended and thus divisible space, at the time when we think it, as indivisible (because as it actually exists it is thus indivisible): and also doing so within an indivisible moment of time, because time, just as extended length, may be conceived of either as divided or as undivided.

And therefore it is impossible to state what was thought in each of the two halves of time: because, unless it be divided, there is no such half existing actually, but only potentially: although, in so far as the reason thinks of the two halves separately, it divides the time likewise, and thinks it just as two lengths.

If, on the other hand, the reason think its object as consisting of two halves, then it thinks them also in a time which is spread over two halves.

With respect to what is indivisible, not quantitatively but specifically, this the reason thinks within an undivided space of time and with the undivided action of the soul [and this not as an essential property of the object which is indivisible], but as an incidental concomitant of the mental process, and thus not in so far as the mental action and the time are divisible, but rather in so far as they are indivisible.

For in such objects also there is something which is indivisible, though perhaps it cannot be separated from its setting — something which makes the time and the length into one; and this also is the case with everything continuous, whether it be so in time or space.

But as for the point and everything which is thus arrived at by division, and yet is in this sense indivisible, its character comes to be elucidated in the same way as negation.

A similar account holds good of other cases.

How, for instance, do we come to know evil or black?

We may say it is through their opposites.

And thus the cognitive faculty must be in such cases potentially both qualities, while at the same time it remains at unity within itself.

If, however, there be a causal mental force, which has no contrary opposed to it, such a faculty knows itself by its own agency, and is realized in full activity and independently of all bodily conditions.

And thus while every statement, as for instance an affirmation, asserts something of something else, and is in every case either true or false, reason is not in every case placed between the alternatives of truth and falsehood: the conception of the notion in its real nature is intrinsically true, and is not merely an assertion that something belongs to something else.

Just in fact as the seeing of the particular quality of sense is always true, while the judgment, whether the white colour is or is not a man is not always true: so similarly the conceptions which are entirely independent of material surroundings are as such always true.