De Anima

Aristotle ยท edition credit: Edwin Wallace

Book 3, reading section 12

Open in workspace
Contents of this edition

Everything that is animate and living must, from its birth to the time of its decay, possess the soul which we describe as nutritive: because whatever has been born must exhibit the phenomena of growth, maturity, and dissolution, and this it cannot do apart from food and nourishment Thus, then, the nutrient capacity must be inherent in all objects that are marked by growth and by decay.

Sensation, on the other hand, need not be present in all things that live: for neither can those objects whose body is altogether simple and uncompounded possess the sense of touch (although without this sense it is impossible to have animal life), nor again can those objects which are unable to receive the form without the matter be endowed with the capacity of sense.

The animal, however, rightly so-called, must possess the powers of sense-perception, if, as we hold, nature produces nothing without a purpose, all natural objects existing for some end, or being the concomitants of objects which exist for some end.

Now, if a body were supplied with faculties of movement, but did not have the power of sense-perception, it would be destroyed, and would not attain its end, which it is nature's work to realize.

For how, we may ask, will such an organism provide food for itself?

It is only those which are stationary that have their food supplied them from their place of origin.

Nor, indeed, is it possible that a body should have soul and discriminating reason and not possess sensation, if it be capable of motion and produced by generation.

Nor indeed, for that matter, will it make any difference if it be actually unbegotten.

For, for what end would such a body be without the faculty of sense?

It could only be because its absence would be better for it either as regards its soul or as regards its body.

But, as matter of fact, the absence of sense could not possibly contribute to either.

The soul will not understand the world better because it is deprived of sense: and the body will not be any more a body because it is without the sensitive capacities.

No body, therefore, not being stationary, possesses soul, without at the same time adding on the faculties of sense.

If, however, it possess the faculty of sense, its body must be either simple or compound.

It cannot, however, be simple: because in that case it would not have the sense of touch: and this it must necessarily possess.

This, in fact, is evident from the following considerations.

Since the animal is a body possessed of soul, and every body is tangible: it follows, since the tangible is perceived by touch, that the body of the living animal must be also endowed with the sense of touch, if the animal is to be able to maintain itself.

For the other senses, such as smell, sight, and hearing, perceive their objects through the medium of other substances: but if an animal, when it came in contact with different substances, were not to have the sense of touch, it would not be able to avoid some and take others: and under these circumstances it would be impossible for it to preserve itself.

Hence taste is, as it were, a sort of touch: for it is applied to nutriment: and nutriment is a body that can be touched.

On the other hand, sound and colour and smell supply no nourishment, nor do they cause either growth or dissolution.

Taste, therefore, it follows, must be a kind of touch, because it is the sense which perceives the tangible and nutritive.

These two senses, then, of taste and touch are indispensable conditions of animal life: evidently, in fact, the animal cannot possibly exist without the sense of touch.

The other senses are directed towards higher ends than mere existence, and do not belong to any class of animals whatever, but only to some particular species of animal.

Thus, for example, they must be possessed by the animal capable of forward movement, because the animal, if it is to be preserved, must be able to perceive an object, not only when brought into immediate contact with it, but also when it is some distance from it Now, this is only possible in case it have the power of perceiving through some intervening medium, this medium being affected and set in motion by the object of sense, while the sense itself in turn is affected by the medium.

[We may illustrate by the manner in which movement is communicated.]

That which produces local movement continues its effect until it makes a change and the original agent in propulsion causes another object to propel, the movement being effected through the intervening object: and just as the first object that moves propels without being propelled, whereas the last member in the chain is propelled only and does not propel, while the middle links (of which there may be many) are both propelling and propelled, so also is it with the alteration [involved in sense-perception], excepting that the alteration is effected without change of position.

Thus, if one were to plunge anything in wax, the wax would be moved so far as one plunged it: a stone under similar treatment would not be moved at all, and water would be so to a still greater degree.

Air, on the other hand, is moved to the greatest possible extent, and both impresses and is impressed so long as it continues still and remains a whole.

And thus, also, to touch upon the theory of " repercussion," it is better to suppose that the air is affected by the colour and the form, so long as it remains unbroken (and it is so over every smooth surface), than that the visual ray after it has issued from the eyes and mixed with objects is then reflected and sent back again.

Hence this air, itself affected by the object, moves in turn the eyesight, much in the same way as if the impress in the wax were to penetrate through to its extremity.