De Anima

Aristotle · edition credit: Edwin Wallace

Book 1, reading section 3

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Before proceeding further we must investigate the subject of movement The truth may be that it is not only false to say that the essential substance of soul is of the character assigned to it by those who assert that soul is that which moves itself or is capable of producing movement: it may be an actual impossibility that movement should be a predicate of soul.

That that which causes motion need not itself be in motion is an opinion which has been previously stated.

But further there are two senses in which ever\thing that is in motion may be said to be so.

The movement may be either directly its own or it may be communicated through something else.

The latter expression is applied to all those things that are moved through being within something which is moved, as is for instance the case with sailors in a ship: the sailors not being moved in the same sense as the vessel, because while the vessel is in movement by itself the sailors are so through being in an object that is moved.

This becomes evident when we apply it to the limbs.

Walking for instance is a movement which belongs distinctively to the feet, it is also a movement which belongs to man as such, and yet it is not true of the sailors at the time when we are considering them.

There are then two senses in which we may say a thing is in motion: and we must now enquire with reference to soul whether in itself it is moved and participates in movement.

Now there are four forms of movement — locomotion, alteration, decomposition and augmentation.

The motion of the soul must be therefore either one of these four forms, or several of them, or all of them taken together.

But further this movement of the soul, if it be not merely an accidental concomitant, must proceed from nature: and, if this be so, space will be an attribute of it, inasmuch as all the movements which we have mentioned occur in space.

[But the soul's movement is no mere accidental concomitant.]

If it be its very essence to set itself in motion, it will not be merely in an incidental sense that motion will belong to it, as is for instance the case with the movement of white colour or three cubits length.

These last are moved indeed, but they are so simply incidentally, in so far as the body in which they inhere is moved; and thus space is no attribute connected with them.

Such space however will be an attribute of the soul if it be the case that the soul participates in movement by its very nature.

Further, if the soul be in motion by its inherent nature, it should also admit of being put in motion by external force: and supposing it to be moved by force, it should also admit of being moved by nature.

So also is it with respect to rest: for when an object is moved by nature into some state or other, it also rests in this by nature, just as when an object is moved into any state by external force it also rests in this state by force.

But even the most vivid imagination will find a difficulty in explaining what would be the character of the forced movements and reposes of the soul.

Again, if the movement of the soul be upward it will be composed of fire, if downward, of earth; such being the directions in which these bodies naturally move.

And the same holds good also of the intermediate elements.

But fourthly, since the soul according to all appearance sets the body in motion, we may reasonably suppose that it originates in the body the same movements as those by which it is itself in movement.

But if this be so, then it follows by conversion that whatever be the movement with which the body is moved, such also is that with which the soul itself is moved.

Now the movement of the body is a local movement.

It follows therefore that the soul would also change its position in respect of the body, executing these changes either in its entirety or in its several parts.

But were this possible it would further follow that the soul would be able after passing out of the body to enter it again: and this in turn would involve the absurd conclusion that animals after having died can rise again.

With regard on the other hand to accidental movement, it is true that the soul could be thus moved incidentally at the hand of something else: the animal in which the soul is contained may be pushed on by external force: and so the soul would be indirectly put in motion.

But if a thing is essentially put in motion of itself, it must not be supposed put in motion by something else (unless in an indirect sense), just as the self-subsisting good should not be the good pursued for other ends nor the good absolute become the good relative.

And yet about the only thing by which the soul, supposing it is moved, could be said to be so, would be the objects of sense.

If on the other hand it be said that the soul sets itself in motion in and by itself alone, it follows that it would also be moved in and by itself.

But all movement is a displacement of the moved qua moved: and therefore the soul would be displaced and taken out of its essential nature, if it be pot merely incidentally that it sets itself in motion.

This however is the reverse of our hypothesis which holds that the motion is an attribute of its essential nature in and by itself

A further modification of this theory is found in the view of those who say that the soul moves the body which contains it in a manner corresponding to that in which the soul itself is moved.

This view is held by Democritus, whose words rather recall the saying of Philippus the comedian, that Daedalus made his wooden Aphrodite capable of movement by pouring quicksilver into her.

Democritus' explanation is in truth not much superior to this.

He tells us that the atomic globules contract and move the whole body in virtue of the law imposed upon them never to remain at rest.

But, we should ask, are these same elements to produce rest also.

How they will produce this result it is difficult or in fact impossible to say.

And indeed generally, apart from any special form of this doctrine, the soul, so far as we can see, moves the body not in this manner but through the agency of purpose and of thought.

The Timaeus similarly explains on physiological principles the manner in which the soul moves the body: reasoning that the soul by the fact that it is itself in motion moves the body also, in consequence of its intricate conjunction with it.

The writer regards the soul as compounded of the different elements and distributed according to the harmonic numbers [which underlie the universe] in order that it might have an original inborn perception of harmony and altogether be borne in harmonious courses.

The soul so compounded, he bent the straight line [of the numbers] round into a circle, and when out of the one circle he had cut two circles connected at two points, he again divided the one circle into seven circles, considering as he did the revolutions of the heaven to correspond with the movements of the soul.

The first objection to this theory is that it is not befitting to speak of the soul as a magnitude, at the same time as the soul of the universe is evidently intended to be some such thing as is the so-called reason: it cannot at least be something like the sensitive or appetitive soul which is so described, as their movement is not circular rotation.

Reason however is, no doubt, marked by unity and continuity, but it is so only in the sense in which the action of thought is so also.

Now the action of thought is equivalent to the objects of thought; and these, it is true, form by their sequence a unity, but it is the unity of a number and not of a geometrical body.

Hence then neither is the reason continuous in this sense but it is either destitute of parts or it is not continuous as a magnitude.

How, in fact, if it be a magnitude, is it to think .

Is it to do so as a whole or only with some one of its parts?

If it be with the parts, it must be either as a magnitude or as a point if we may call this last a part.

/If, however, it be as a point, then, as the number of points in a given magnitude is endless, the process of thought will never reach an end; if it be as a magnitude it will think the same thing frequently or without limit.

But, as matter of observation, thought may be exercised once for all.

Besides if it be sufficient for the soul to have touched with any of its parts, what need is there for it to move in a circle or indeed to have magnitude at all?

If, on the other hand, it be necessary for thought that it should touch with the whole circle of the soul, what will happen when it touches with the parts?

How further is it to think that which has parts through that which is without parts, or that which is without parts by that which has parts?

And yet (from the standpoint of the Timaeus) reason must be a circle of this material kind: for thinking must be the movement of reason just as revolving is that of a circle: so that if thinking be a process of revolving it follows that reason would be the circle of which such a revolution constitutes thought.

And again the soul will be continually involved in thought, since (as is asserted in the Timaeus) circular movement is everlasting.

[This however is opposed to all experience:] in the case of processes of thought leading to action there are certain ends which limit them, all being for the sake of something else, and thoughts applied to speculation only are limited in the same manner as the reasoned explanations which they involve.

Now every explanation resolves itself into either a definition or a deductive demonstration.

But as for demonstrations, they both start from a principle as a beginning and have as it were a termination in the syllogism or the conclusion; and even if they do not reach a termination, still they do not turn back again to the beginning, but, employing always a fresh middle term and an extreme, proceed forward in a straight line, whereas a circular movement always returns back Xo the beginning.

The same thing holds good also of definitions: they are all limited and determined.

Besides, if the same revolution takes place a great many times, it will be necessary to think the same thing frequently.

Further, thought bears a greater similarity to rest and stoppage than to motion: and so also is it likewise with syllogism.

Happiness, again, cannot be an attribute of that which is acted on by force and does not happen with ease: and if, to obviate this difficulty, it be held that movement does not constitute the soul's essential nature, its movement would be contrary to nature.

It is burdensome also for the soul to be united with the body without possibility of release from it: and not only so, but such union is even something which is to be if possible avoided, supposing it to be better for the reason to be independent of the body, as is usually said and widely believed.

There is an obscurity also as to the reason why the heavens are carried in a circle; for it is not the essential nature of the soul which is the reason of its being carried in a circle, this movement being merely incidental to it: nor is it the body which is the cause, the soul being rather the cause which produces movement in the body.

Nor indeed is it asserted that the soul moves in this manner because it is its better course.

God however must have made the soul to be moved in this circular fashion for no other reason than that it was better for it to be in movement than to remain at rest, and, further, better to be moved in this manner than in any other.

Such an investigation however can be more appropriately discussed in other fields of study, and may be therefore for the present left aside.

There is however one peculiar inconsistency which we may note as marking this and most other psychological theories.

They place the soul in the body and attach it to the body without trying in addition to determine the reason why or the condition of the body under which such attachment is produced.

This would seem however to be a real question calling for solution: in so far as it is by reason of this communion that the one factor is active the other passive, and that the one sets in motion the other is in motion: and relations of this kind are never found in cases of mere juxtaposition.

The thinkers however to whom we are referring attempt to state the nature of the soul only: with regard to the nature of the body which is to receive the soul they determine nothing in particular.

And thus, although every body seems to possess a distinctive form and character, they act as if it were possible for any soul to clothe itself in any body, after the manner of the tales which Pythagoreans tell of transmigration.

Their account in fact is much like speaking of the carpenter's art as clothing itself in flutes: the truth being that just as art makes use of its appropriate instruments, so the soul must make use of its fitting body.