De Anima

Aristotle · edition credit: Edwin Wallace

Book 2, reading section 2

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It is however by proceeding from that which in the order of nature is indistinct, but is relatively to us more obvious and manifest, that we reach what is clear and more intelligible in the order of thought.

We must therefore make a fresh attempt to discuss soul in this manner.

For a definition should not, as most definitions do, merely assert the existence of an object and say what it is: it should also contain and express the cause or reason of the object.

But, as usually framed, the terms of definitions are merely like conclusions.

Thus, for example, let us ask — What is squaring?

Squaring, it will be answered, is the construction of a rectangular equilateral figure equal to another figure with unequal sides.

Now such a definition is merely like the statement of a conclusion.

To say, on the other hand, that squaring is the discovery of a mean proportional is to state the cause which explains the result

It may serve as a fresh beginning for our inquiry to say that the animate is distinguished from the inanimate or soulless by the fact of life.

There are a number of ways in which a thing is said to live; yet should it possess only one of them — as for example, reason, sense — perception, local movement and rest, and further movement in respect of nutrition as well as of decay and growth — we say it lives.

Hence it is that all plants are thought to live; because they manifestly contain within themselves such a power and principle as enables them to acquire growth and undergo decay in opposite directions; for they do not while growing upwards not grow downwards but they grow in both directions and on all sides, and they continue to live so long as they can assimilate nourishment Now this faculty of nutrition may be separated from the other functions; but in the case of mortal creatures the other faculties cannot exist apart from this, as indeed is evident from plants which possess no other psychic power except this faculty of growth.

It is then through this principle of nutrition that life is an attribute of all living things.

At the same time the animal strictly so called only begins when we reach sensation: for even those objects which do not move themselves nor change their position but possess sensation are said to be animals and not merely to be living.

Among the senses themselves, it is touch which is the fundamental attribute of all animal forms.

And just as the nutritive function may exist apart from touch and every form of sense, so also may touch exist without any of the other senses.

Thus while nutritive is the name given to that part of the soul in which plants share as Well as animals, all animals are found to possess the sense of touch.

Why each of these faculties is so allotted we shall state hereafter: here it may be enough to say that the soul is the source and Centre of the various states here mentioned and is determined and defined by those powers of nutrition, sensation, understanding and movement.

With regard to these several functions, whether each is the soul or a part of the soul; and if a part, whether so as only to be separable in thought or actually in space — with regard to some of these questions it is not difficult to see the answer, while others present difficulties.

For just as, in the case of plants, some parts when divided are found to live even when separated from one another — a fact which seems to shew that the soul within them exists as actually one though it is potentially several; so also do we see it happen with respect to another specific aspect of the soul in the case of insects which have been divided.

In such a case, each of the divided parts possesses sensation and the power of local movement, and if sensation, then also in addition imagination and desire: for where sense is present, there pain and pleasure follow also as concomitants, and where pain and pleasure exist, appetite is also necessarily present.

With regard on the other hand to reason and the faculty of thought we have as yet no obvious facts to appeal to.

Reason however would seem to constitute a different phase of soul from those we have already noticed and it alone admits of separation as the eternal from the perishable.

But as for the other parts of soul, it is clear from these considerations that they are not separated in the way that some maintain.

At the same time it is evident that in thought and by abstraction they may be divided from one another.

The sensitivity is one thing, the reflective faculty another, if it be one thing to have sensation, another thing to exercise reflection.

And this same truth holds good also of the other powers which have been described.

Respecting these various powers, there are some animals which possess them all, others which have merely some of them, and others again which have but one only.

It is this which makes the difference between one class of animals and another, though the reason for this fact can only be investigated afterwards.

The same thing may be noticed also as regards the senses.

Some animals have all of them, others have but some, and a third class possesses only that one sense which is most indispensable — viz. touch.

[Life, then, and sensation are what mark the animate.]

But there are two ways in which we may speak of that by which we live and have sensation just as also that by which we know may be employed to denote either knowledge or the mind, by both of which we are in the habit of speaking of people as knowing.

So also that by which we are in health denotes on the one hand the health itself, on the other hand some portion of the body or it may be the whole of it.

Now of these two uses, knowledge and health are what we may term the determining form and notion and so to speak the realization of the recipient faculty, in the one case of knowledge, in the other of health — for the passive material which is subject to modification is what is taken to be the home of the manifestation of the active forces.

Soul then is the original and fundamental ground of all our life, of our sensation and of our reasoning.

It follows therefore that the soul must be regarded as a sort of form and idea, rather than as matter and as underlying subject.

For the term real substance is, as we have before remarked, employed in three senses: it may denote either the specific form, or the material substratum, or thirdly the combination of the two: and of these different aspects of reality the matter or substratum is but the potential ground, whereas the form is the perfect realization.

Since then it is the product of the two that is animate, it cannot be that the body is the full realization or expression of the soul; rather on the contrary it is the soul which is the full realization of some body.

This fact fully supports the view of those who hold that the soul is not independent of some sort of body and yet not to be identified with a body of any sort whatever.

The truth is that soul is not body but it is something which belongs to body.

And hence further it exists in a body and in a body of such and such a nature, not left undetermined in the way that earlier thinkers introduced it into the body without determining besides what and what sort of body it was, although it does not even look as though any casual thing admitted any other casual thing.

This same conclusion may be reached also on a priori grounds.

The full realization of each object is naturally reached only within that which is potentially existent and within that material substratum which is appropriate to it.

It is clear then from these considerations that soul is a kind of full realization or expression of the idea of that which has potentially the power to be of such a character.