There are, however, at least two faculties which are manifestly motive — viz., desire or reason, if we regard imagination as a form of reason.
Frequently, in fact, it is the pictures of imagination as against knowledge that people follow, and among animals other than man it is not thought nor ratiocination, but simply this power of representing images of sense, which guides them.
Both then reason and desire are fitted to produce and lead to local movement The reason which is here intended is that which calculates for some purpose — that is, it is the practical reason, distinguished from the speculative by its end.
As for desire, // is always directed to some object: in fact.
It is the object at which desire aims that forms the starting point of the practical reason, although it is some particular detail which forms the beginning of the action.
It is then on good grounds that people have viewed as springs of action these two faculties of desire and practical intellect: for the faculty of desire has itself a motive force, and the intellect excites to action just in so far as the object of desire supplies it with a starting-point: just as, similarly, imagination when it moves to action does not do so independently of desire.
The spring of action thus resolves itself into one single thing, viz. the object of desire.
For if there were two faculties acting as springs to action — reason on the one hand, desire on the other — they would have to move in virtue of some common character they shared.
Now reason, it is found, does not act as a spring of action independently of desire: for settled wish is a form of desire, and when a man is led to act according to his reasonable conviction he is moved also in a manner corresponding to his wish.
Desire, however, excites to action contrarily to reason, appetite, which so acts, being one of the forms of desire.
And thus, then, it would seem, reason is always true and right, whereas desire and imagination may be both right and not right.
It is then always the object of desire that moves to action: and this is either the good or the apparent good — not good, however, as a whole, but simply that form of it which relates to action — that is, which is contingent and admits of being other than it is.
Evidently, therefore, it is such a faculty of the soul, the so-called principle of desire, which moves to action.
Those, then, that divide the soul into different parts must, if a difference of powers be the basis of their separation, recognise a great variety of such parts — the nutrient, sentient, rational, deliberative, and, further, the conative or desiring — all these being separated by wider differences from one another than are the principle of appetite and that of spirited indignation.
The very opposition of desires itself attests the oneness of the motive faculty.
Such opposition happens when the reason and the appetite come together into conflict and displays itself in beings with a sense of time.
With such beings, reason, from its perception of the future, enjoins resistance on the mind, while appetite is influenced by a present which is vanishing: for that which is momentarily pleasant appears both absolutely pleasant and absolutely good, because the future is unseen.
Now, such a conflict of desires requires that the motive agent, the principle of desire, as such, should be specifically but one: and the most primary of all is the object of desire, for this, without being itself moved, creates movement by being made an object of thought or presented before us by imagination.
Numerically, however, the motive agents may be several.
Now, there are three elements in motion, one being the object which produces movement, the second that by which it moves, and the third the object which is moved.
Now, of these three, the object which produces movement is two-fold, being on the one hand itself unmoved, and on the other hand not only moving but also moved.
That then which while it produces movement remains itself unmoved is the good as applied to action: the element which at once sets and is set in movement is the faculty of desire (for the subject desiring is moved, in so far as it desires, and desire itself is a form of movement so far as it manifests itself in action): the object which is moved is the living being.
As for the organ through which desire produces movement, that is necessarily of corporeal nature: and must therefore be investigated among the functions common to the body and the soul.
If we may, however, speak for the present summarily on the subject, that which moves instrumentally must be such that in it beginning and end coincide, as is the case, for instance, with the pivot of a joint: for there both convex and concave meet together, the one acting as end, the other as beginning.
Hence, while the one part is at rest, the other is in movement —that is, the two, while different in their purpose or idea, are in real magnitude inseparable: for all movement is the result of impulse or attraction, and there must be therefore always something which remains fixed, like the centre of a circle, as the source from which movement may begin.
Generally then it is, as has been said, in so far as the animal is endowed with the faculty of desire that it is capable of moving itself.
But no animal can be provided with the faculty of desire unless it have imaginative power.
Now, all such power is connected either with the reason or the senses: and in it other animals besides men participate.