The soul of animals is, as we have seen before, characterized by two capacities — on the one hand, the cognitive discriminative faculty as shared by understanding and by sense, on the other hand, the faculty of local movement.
The nature of sense and intellect has been so far settled: we must now investigate the motive faculty of the soul, and ask whether it is some distinct part of it, separable either actually or by abstraction, or whether, on the contrary, it be the soul taken as a whole: and further, if it be some one part of the soul, whether it be some special part different from these usually recognised and enumerated, or whether, on the contrary, it is some one of these which have been stated.
An immediate question which arises is — in what sense are we to speak of parts of the soul, and how many are there of them.
From one point of view such parts appear innumerable, and not confined merely to the "rational," "spirited," and "appetitive" parts which some distinguish, or the rational and irrational which others enumerate.
The characteristics, on the ground of which they distinguish these, shew also other parts further distant from each other than these are — the parts in question being just those which we have before described — the vegetative, which is an attribute at once of plants and every animal — the sentient, which cannot be easily classed either as rational or irrational — and, further, the imaginative faculty, which is different in its action and aspect from all, while with which of them is it either the same or different is a question full of perplexities, if we assume so many distinct parts of soul.
Besides these, there is the conative or desiring faculty, which would seem to be different from all, both in its conception and in its capacity for action.
Now, it is absurd to parcel this out in the manner indicated.
The settled wish [which is one of its aspects] constitutes itself within the rational part of soul, while the appetite and passion, which are its other factors, lie within the sphere of the irrational.
And thus, if there be three parts of the soul, desire will have to be present in each of them.
To return, then, to our original question — What is the part that communicates local movement to the animal.
As for the movements of growth and decay, they would seem, as they are the attributes of all animals, to be caused by those powers of production and nutrition which characterize all animal life: and with regard to respiration and expiration, as also sleep and waking, we must investigate their nature on another occasion, as they are marked by many difficulties.
Our present task is to investigate the nature of local movement, and see what it is that moves the animal in the way of progressive movement Evidently It is not the mere vegetative capacity which does so.
Local movement is always directed to some end, and is accompanied either by a representative image or by a desire, since nothing — unless indeed its movement be the result of force — moves without seeking either to gain or to escape something.
And further, plants would be capable of local movement and would possess some part instrumental for this movement.
As little is it the faculty of sense which causes local movement.
There are many animals which possess sense powers and yet continue throughout fixed and unmoved.
But nature makes nothing without a purpose, nor leaves anything, mutilated and imperfect forms excepted, without that which it requires.
Now the animals in question are perfect, and not mutilated^ they possess generative powers, and exhibit both development and decay.
And therefore [ — if sense alone were a sufficient reason for the exercise of local movement — ] such animals would possess all the parts instrumental for movement.
Neither, further, is the ratiocinative part, nor the so-called reason, that which produces movement The speculative reason thinks nothing which relates to action, nor does it assert anything with regard to the object of pursuit and aversion: whereas movement is invariably connected with one either pursuing or avoiding something.
Nor indeed, even when the reason reflects on something of this character, does it even then advise the individual either to pursuit or to aversion.
Frequently, for example, the reason thinks of something terrible or pleasant, but it does not thereby produce fear: the only result is that the heart, in case the object be terrible, or some other part, in case it be pleasant, is excited.
Furthermore, even when reason gives a command, and understanding bids us either avoid or pursue something, the individual is not moved accordingly, but follows the direction of appetite, as may be seen in the incontinent So also, in general, we see that the man who understands the art of healing does not on that account therefore heal, a fact which shews that it requires something besides knowledge to produce the results of knowledge: and that scientific knowledge IS itself unable to effect this end.
Lastly, desire is not fitted to produce this movement: the continent, though subject to desire and appetite, do not do these things for which they possess a desire, but follow, on the contrary, the lead of reason.