[Desire then, thus depending on the power of representing images of sense], it falls to us to ask, besides, what is the motive Dree in those imperfect animals which possess no sense but hat of touch, and see whether it is or is not possible for imagination and appetite to belong to them.
Pleasure and pain they o indeed evidently feel: and if these belong to them, then appetite, it follows, must be there as well.
But it is difficult see how they can have imagination.
Perhaps, however, we may say that just as their movements are vague and indeterminate, so also they possess the powers in question, although merely in a vague and imperfect manner.
The simple power of representing images of sense exists, as re have already said, in other animals as well as man.
The power, on the contrary, of representing images for deliberation is confined to animals that reason.
For the question whether this r that is to be done is work that calls for reason and reflection: and since it is the stronger and the more preferable which desire pursues, it must always measure by one standard, and so it is enabled to form one conception out of several images which represent sensations.
Hence the reason why animals, while possessing the faculty of representing images of sense, are not bought to have opinion.
They do not possess the kind of desire which forms itself as the conclusion of syllogism, while at the same time such deliberate desire always involves the possession of opinion: and thus their desire is destitute of any faculty of deliberation.
In the case of man, however, sometimes the images of sense overcome and move the rational volition: sometimes, as in incontinence, two things in turn overcome and stir up one another, desire thus following on desire much as a ball that players toss about: but the normal and natural course is always that in which the superior force of reason is the more supreme, and stimulates to action.
Thus, then, altogether there are three courses of movement possible among the springs of action: although, it should be added, the cognitive faculty is not moved, but continues permanent.
Since, however, this cognitive faculty presents itself, on the one hand, as a conception and judgment about the universal, on the other hand as a conception of the particular — the one asserting that all men of such and such character should do such and such actions, the other explaining that this particular action is of this nature, and that I am an individual of the kind described — it is this latter form of opinion, rather than the universal, that stimulates to action, or it is both of them together, the one, however, more as in repose, the other in activity.