De Anima

Aristotle ยท edition credit: Edwin Wallace

Book 3, reading section 13

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The body of the animal cannot, it is evident, consist of any one single element, such as for instance fire or air.

The reason of this is that touch is the necessary pre-supposition of the other senses, because, as we have said, every animate body is also provided with the sense of touch.

Now, all the other elements except earth might serve as organs of the senses, but they all effect perception only mediately.

Touch, on the contrary, acts by direct contact with its objects, and from this very circumstance, in fact, derives its name: and though the other senses do also perceive by contact, yet it is by contact through a third thing: whereas touch seems to perceive by direct contact on its own part.

Thus the body of the animal cannot be composed of any such element as forms the medium to the other senses.

Nor yet can it be composed of earth alone.

For touch applies itself as a central state to all things tangible, and its organ is fitted to receive, not only the different qualities of earth, but also of the hot and cold, and of all other tangible qualities of body.

And hence it is that we have no perception through the bones and hair and such like parts, because they are composed of earth entirely.

Plants, again, do not have any powers of sense-perception, because they are composed totally of earth.

Apart from touch, however, no other powers of senseperception can exist: and this organ of touch is composed neither of the earth nor of any other of the elements.

It is manifest, therefore, that the absence of this sense alone must involve the animal's death: for nothing can possess this without being a living animal, nor need the animal, to be an animal, have any sense but this one.

Hence the objects of the other senses โ€” such as, for example, colour, sound, and scent โ€” do not by their excess destroy the animal itself, but only the organ, although it may incidentally destroy the animal frame as well: as, for example, when a push and blow accompany a sound, or when what is directly seen and smelled sets in movement other forces which destroy life by their contact So also flavour may cause destruction in this manner โ€” in so far, that is, as it is incidentally something tangible.

In the case of objects of touch, however, such as heat and cold and hardness, excess destroys [not only the sense-organ but also] the animal itself.

The object of any sense, in fact, destroys, if it be developed to excess, the organ of sense: and in this same way, then, tangible objects destroy the sense of touch.

But life itself is constituted by this sense, since, as has been shewn before, the animal cannot exist without the sense of touch.

And thus excess in things tangible destroys not only the organ of sense but the animal itself as well, because this is the one sense absolutely essential to animal life; while as regards the other senses, the animal has them, as has been said, not for bare existence, but for the sake of higher ends.

Thus, for instance, it possesses sight, so that it may see objects both in air and water, and in general in whatever is transparent.

Taste, on the other hand, it possesses for the sake of discriminating the agreeable and disagreeable in food, so that it may desire and move itself accordingly.

Hearing, again, it possesses so that it may convey a meaning to itself: the tongue it possesses so that it may express something or other to another.