De Anima

Aristotle · edition credit: Edwin Wallace

Book 2, reading section 5

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The character of sense-perception as a whole is the next subject which it falls to us to discuss.

And perception, it was said, takes place as a result of being moved and being impressed: common opinion in fact views it as a sort of qualitative change or alteration.

Now it is a doctrine held by some that in an impression like is affected by like.

How far this is possible or impossible we have stated in our general discussion on the subject of the active and the passive processes.

It suggests however at once the question — why is there no perception or sense of the senses themselves, and why do the senses not produce a perception without the help of external objects, when there is contained within them fire and earth and the other elements which are objects of perception either in themselves or in virtue of their properties.

Evidently, it follows, the power of sense perception exists not as something actually exercised, but only as something potential.

And so the case is parallel to that of combustible material, which is not burnt by itself without the presence of that which can set it on fire: otherwise it would set fire to itself, and there would be no need for the help of actual fire.

We must note however that we use the word 'perceive’ in two senses.

In the case of that which has the power to hear and see, we say it hears and sees, even if it chance to be asleep, just as much as we do in the case of that which is already actually at work.

Perception therefore would be similarly used in two senses, on the one hand as in potentiality, on the other hand as in actuality: and this same distinction will in turn apply to the object of perception, which is from one aspect potential, from another actual.

Let us then in the first place agree to regard in our discussion the words "passive impression" "movement" and "activity" as identical: for movement is a species of realized activity, though, as has been elsewhere said, it is imperfect.

Now in every instance things are impressed and set in movement by something which is capable of producing an impression and which exists in full activity.

And thus an impression is in one sense made by the like, in another sense by the unlike, as has been already said; for it is as unlike that anything suffers an impression: after the impression has been made, it is converted into like.

But, in the second place, a distinction must be drawn with reference to potentiality and actuality; at present we are speaking about them as if they admitted of no variations of meaning.

For instance any individual may be described as knowing (1) in the sense in which we should describe a man as knowing, because, i.e., man is included in the class of beings that are intelligent and gifted with knowledge; or (2) an individual might be said to know in the sense in which we speak of a person as knowing

only after he has acquired a knowledge of the principles of grammar.

Now of these two persons, each possesses the capacity for knowledge in a different sense — the one because the generic character and fundamental nature of man is of this description, the other because if he wished he would be able to apply his knowledge, supposing that no obstacle prevented him.

He on the other hand (3) who has advanced so far as to apply his knowledge is in a state of full realization and knows in the strict sense of the word — for instance that this definite thing is A, As compared then with this third, both of these first mentioned possess knowledge only in potentiality: but they do so in different senses, the one because in order to become a man of knowledge he must have been transformed by learning and in many cases changed from the directly contrary state: the other because, while possessing, though not employing (say) perceptive faculties or grammatical principles, he can proceed to use them when he wishes.

Suffering or impression similarly is not used in one single sense.

On the one hand, it is equivalent to some sort of destruction by the opposite; on the other hand it is rather the preservation of that which exists potentially by means of the actual and similar, much in the same way in which potential capacity' stands to actual reality.

That for example which possesses knowledge rises into actual consciousness: and this is either not to be described as alteration (because its advance is towards itself and its own perfect development) or it is a different kind of alteration from that usually signified.

Hence it is not correct to say that a thinking being is at the time of thinking undergoing alteration: as little as that the housebuilder is so at the time when he is building.

The process therefore which transforms what is potential into what is actual in relation to a reasoning and thinking being should be called not instruction but should be known by some other name; and similarly, with reference to that which, on the basis of what is merely potential, learns and receives knowledge at the hands of that which is actual and capable of teaching, we either must not speak of it as 'suffering' an impression (as has been said) or we must recognise two different forms of alteration, the one a transition into the merely negative phase of a previous state, the other a transition into the established and natural condition.

In the sensitive subject the first form of transition is effected by the generating parent: after birth however the subject born comes to possess sensation in the further way of an intelligent experience.

The actual exercise of sense comes to be used in fact as equivalent to thought, with this difference, however, that in the case of sense the objects which stimulate the faculty into action — that is the objects of sight, hearing and of the other senses, come from outside.

The reason of this is that sense-perception when in active exercise deals with individual objects, whereas intelligent experience is concerned with universals: and these last are in a way contained within the mind itself.

Hence it is within a man's own power to think whenever he wishes: but sense-perception is not thus in his own hands: because the object of sense must be beforehand present.

The same holds good also of the sciences that deal with sensible phenomena: and this too for the same reason, because the objects of sense are individual and external.

We must however postpone the fuller discussion of this subject to another occasion.

At present we may regard this much as settled — that just as what is described as potential is not used in one single sense, but on the one hand in the sense according to which we should speak of the boy as able potentially to be a general and on the other hand in that according to which we should say that the man in prime of life is potentially so able: so also is it with the power of sense-perception.

Since however the distinction in question, although we have settled that the two senses are different and also how they are different, is not recognised by language, we must employ the words impression and alteration as current terms.

But, as has been said, the faculty of sense -perception is potentially what the object of sense is actually.

During the process of perception then the faculty of sense is not similar to its object; but after the impression, it is assimilated and becomes analogous to it.