De Anima

Aristotle ยท edition credit: Edwin Wallace

Book 2, reading section 6

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In dealing with the senses separately we must begin by a description of their objects.

The so-called object of sense-perception may mean three different things, of which two are said to be perceived directly in themselves, the third incidentally and with regard to its concomitants.

Of the two firstmentioned, one is special and confined to each one of the senses separately, the other is common to them all.

By the special is to be understood that which it is impossible to perceive by any other sense than that appropriated to it and with respect to which that sense cannot be deceived.

So it is that colour stands to sight, sound to hearing, flavour to taste: touch, however, it must be added, deals with a number of different qualities.

Each single sense in fact discerns these different qualities, and is subject to no delusion as to whether it be a colour or whether it be a sound that it perceives: its only doubt is zvhat it is that is coloured or zvhere it is, or what or where is the body that is sounding.

Such are the objects of perception which are said to be peculiar to each separate sense.

The common sensibles are movement, rest, number, figure, magnitude; such properties being peculiar to no one single sense but shared in common by them all.

Movement for instance is perceived at once by touch and by sight.

By the term incidental sensible I describe such a case as when a certain white object is perceived as the son of Diares: for here there is but an incidental or indirect perception of this object, in so far as the object which is perceived is an incident or property of what is white.

Hence then the organ of sense is affected in no way by the object of sense so far as it is such and such a person or thing.

But among those objects of sense which are perceived directly in themselves, it is those special to the separate senses that are strictly the objects of perception and those for which the essential nature of each sense is naturally adapted.