De Anima

Aristotle · edition credit: Edwin Wallace

Book 2, reading section 4

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The investigation of the faculties of the soul demands that we should discover what each of them is and then proceed similarly to consider allied and remaining questions.

In order however to state the nature of each of them, as for example the faculty of thought or sense or of nutrition, we must beforehand explain what is thinking and what is the act of perception: for viewed in the light of their essential notion the actions which give expression to a power are prior to the power itself.

And if this be so, and it be necessary to consider even before the actions their objects, it will, for the same reason, be our first duty to settle about them, as for instance about food and the object of sense and the object of thought.

Food and generation should therefore be the first subjects of our inquiry: for the nutritive faculty is an attribute of other beings as well as man and is that primary and most common function of the soul in virtue of which life is an attribute of all animals.

Its office is to generate and to make use of sustenance.

In animals in fact that are perfect and not impaired by any defect or that are not created by spontaneous generation the most natural function is to create another like itself, animal thus producing animal, plant plant, so that they may as far as possible partake of the eternal and divine: for this desire is universal and constitutes the end of all natural action — 'end,' it should be remembered, meaning not only the person for which but also the purpose at which something is directed.

Since then it is impossible to share in the eternal and the divine in the same identical person, because nothing mortal can remain numerically the same and individual, each individual shares in this in the way it can, in some cases to a greater, in others to a less degree, and though not actually the same it continues as it were the same, because, though not one numerically, it continues one specifically.

The soul then is the cause and basis of the body as alive; and is so in each of the three senses in which the word cause is used: that is to say it is so both as the efficient cause from which movement springs, as the end or final cause and as the real or essential substance of animate bodies.

That the soul is so as essential substance is evident.

In the case of all objects, the cause of their existence constitutes their essential substance.

Now it is life which constitutes the existence of all animals, and of these processes of life soul is at once the cause and origin; and further, in the case of something which exists potentially, it is the full realization which is the notion or essential nature.

It is equally clear that soul is cause in the sense of end or final cause.

Like reason, nature acts for the sake of some object; and this object is its end.

Now in the animal world the soul is naturally something of this character.

All natural bodies are instruments of the soul: and just as it is with the bodies of animals so also is it with those of plants, all being there simply for the sake of soul.

But in saying that the soul is the end or final cause, we must remember that the word *end' is used in two senses, and must understand it as meaning that at which a thing aims quite as much as that for which it exists.

Lastly, the soul is also cause as being the original source of local movement, a faculty however which all creatures do not have.

The soul also exhibits phenomena of alteration and augmentation: for sensation is held to be a form of alteration and nothing possesses this faculty of sense unless it participate in soul.

So also is it with augmentation and decay: nothing decays or grows in a natural manner except it receive nutrition: and nothing is nurtured except it partake of life.

This is a subject in which Empedocles has not expressed himself correctly.

He maintains that the growth of plants when they strike their roots downwards is due to the fact that the earth [of which they are composed] is by a natural law carried in this direction: while their growth upwards is caused by the fact that their other element, the fire, is borne in this direction.

Here Empedocles takes neither 'up' nor 'down' correctly.

The 'up' and the 'down’ are not the same for all individual objects as for the universe: the head for instance among animals corresponds to the roots in plants, if it be their functions that should determine organs as same and different.

Besides, the question rises, what is it that combines elements such as fire and earth when carried in opposite directions.

They will be pulled asunder, if there be not something to prevent it, and if there be, then this something is the soul and the cause of growth and nourishment.

There are some who hold that fire alone is the cause of nutrition and growth: because it is evidently the only one among bodies or elements that feeds and increases itself: and hence it might be thought to be the agent for effecting this in plants and animals.

Now fire is in a way the concomitant and condition of growth: it is not however absolutely and by itself the cause: rather it is the soul which is so.

The increase of fire proceeds without any limit, so long as there is material to burn: whereas in the case of all natural organisms there is an idea which determines their magnitude and increase: and this belongs to the soul and not to the fire, to the ideal form rather than to the indeterminate matter.

As the same faculty of soul is at once nutrient and generative, it is necessary in the first place to determine the nature of nutriment: for it is by nutrition that this faculty is distinguished from the other powers.

Nutrition then is thought to consist in the absorption of the opposite by the opposite.

This however need not be taken to mean that every opposite is nurtured by every other, but is meant to be applied only to all those opposites that derive not only their origin, but also their increase from one another: for there are many things that originate from one another, e. g. health from sickness, but the change does not always take the form of a quantitative increase.

But it appears that not even do such quantitative contraries act as nutriment to one another in the same manner: liquid, for example, serves as nutriment to fire: but fire does not conversely serve as nutriment to liquid.

And indeed it seems to be especially in the case of simple bodies that the contraries stand to one another in the relation of nourishment and nourished.

Here, however, a difficulty meets us.

There are some who on the one hand maintain that like is nurtured by the like, just as the like is increased by the like: while others, as we have said, hold on the other hand that the contrary is so by the contrary, because (they say) the like cannot be affected by the like.

The nutriment, they maintain, changes and suffers digestion, and change, they add, always tends towards the opposite or the intermediate.

And besides, they argue, the nutriment is affected to some extent by the object which it nurtures, while this is not altered by the nutriment, just as the artisan is not affected by the material on which he operates but this material on the contrary' by the artist: the workman only transforming it from inertness into actuality.

The real question here is what is to be regarded as the nutriment: and whether nutriment is to be taken as it ultimately reaches the system or in its first form is a matter that is disputed.

If it be allowed to be both, but be in the one case digested, in the other case undigested, it might be possible to describe nutriment in terms of both the theories which have been enunciated.

So far in fact as the food is undigested, the contrary is nurtured by the contrary: so far as it is digested, the like is nurtured by the like.

Evidently then there is a mixture of truth and error in the two views.

But as nothing can be fed and nurtured except it participate in life, it is the animate body as such that receives nutriment: and thus nutriment is relative to an animate being and is essentially determined by such relation.

There is however a difference between the import of nutriment and that of growth.

So far as the animate body is something quantitative, it admits of growth, so far as it is a definite individual substance, it requires nutriment.

The food in other words preserves the substance and continues to operate so long as this substance is nurtured: and it produces the generation not of the object nourished but of something else resembling it: for the object nourished already exists as a substance, and nothing generates itself but only maintains its own existence.

Thus then this rudimentary psychic form as we have described it, is a power adapted for preserving that which possesses this psychic form in so far as it possesses it: and nutriment enables it to act, so that when deprived of nutriment it is unable to exist.

Three elements have here then to be recognized: first, the object nourished; secondly, that with which it is nourished: and thirdly, the power so nourishing it.

Of these the last mentioned is the rudimentary or primary soul: the object nourished is the body which contains this soul, while that with which it is nourished is nutriment (Everything however should be named in reference to the end it realizes, and since the end of this function of the soul is to produce another like itself, the first and rudimentary form of soul would be the generative — generative, that is, of another like itself) That by which the nutriment is effected is twofold, just as likewise that by which we steer a ship may denote either the hand or the rudder — the one of which is at once moving and moved, the other moving only.

Further it is necessary that all nutriment should be able to be digested, and this digestion is produced by heat: and thus everything animate possesses heat.

A sketch has thus been given of the nature of nutriment: it will be necessary however to examine the subject with more detail in the treatise appropriate to it