De Anima

Aristotle · edition credit: Edwin Wallace

Book 1, reading section 4

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There is still another opinion handed down respecting soul which meets with acceptance at the hands of many no less than any of the views which have been stated, though even in popularly written treatises it has been examined and brought, as it were, to account for its assumptions.

The soul is by the doctrine in question regarded as a harmony of some sort.

A harmony, it is argued, is a blending and conjunction of opposites: and it is out of opposites that the body is composed.

Harmony however it may be objected (i) is either a certain ratio of composition or an adjustment of bodies: and the soul cannot be described by either of these terms.

Besides (2) movement is not a property which can be predicated of a harmony: while it is by almost all thinkers attributed to the soul.

Harmony again (3) is a term which may be applied to health and to the bodily excellencies in general with much more propriety than to the soul: as would be (4) very evident if we should attempt to explain the feelings and functions of the soul by resolving them into some special harmony: so difficult is it to make them correspond.

It may be added further (5) that in speaking of a harmony we do so with reference to two points.

In the strictest sense, the term denotes so closely fitting an adjustment on the part of bodies possessed of movement and position as lets in nothing homogeneous; and hence secondly it is applied also to the ratio which holds between things that are compounded.

In neither of these two senses can the soul be reasonably regarded as a harmony.

The adjustment of the parts of the body is very easy to be discovered: there are many such adjustments and they can be effected in a great variety of manners.

Of what part then, we may ask, are we to suppose the reason is an adjustment or how are we to suppose it to be effected?

or, again, what adjustment is it that forms the sentient or the appetitive nature?

It is equally absurd' to regard the soul as the expression of the ratio of the composition.

The composition of the elements forming flesh is subject to a different ratio or proportion from that which forms bone; and if the soul be merely this ratio of composition then it will follow that we have many souls spread over the whole body, because all the parts of the body are formed from elements combined together and ex hypothesi it is the ratio regulating their composition which constitutes a harmony and therefore soul.

This too suggests a question we might put to Empedocles relatively to his statement that each of the bodily parts is determined by a certain ratio.

Whether, we might ask, is the soul this ratio, or is it something else which is implanted in the members?

And further does the principle of 'love' give rise to any composition whatsoever or only to that standing in a certain ratio; and if the latter, is this love the ratio itself or is it something else outside the ratio?

Difficulties then of this kind may be raised upon the supposition that soul is a harmony.

At the same time, if the soul be something different from the composition of the bodily parts,, the question rises, how comes it that the soul is annihilated when the flesh and the other parts of the animal organism are destroyed — and further, if, after giving up the view which regards soul as the ratio of the composition, it can no longer be maintained that each of the parts of the body possesses a soul, it is difficult to see what it is that is destroyed when the soul has taken its departure.

It is evident then from what has been said that the soul cannot be a harmony: and further that it cannot have a circular movement.

It may however, as we have said, be moved and move itself incidentally, so far as that in which it is contained may be moved, and this itself moved by the soul: otherwise, it is impossible for it to exhibit local movement.

A more plausible standpoint, however, from which to raise doubts in support of the movement of the soul might be found in an appeal to the fact that the soul is (as we say) pained, takes joy, shews confidence, is exposed to fear, and further is angered and perceives and pursues inferences — all such operations being viewed as processes of movement.

Hence then it might be supposed the soul itself is moved.

This, however, need not be the case.

It may be indeed that feeling pain or rejoicing or exercising thought are motions in the fullest sense, and each of them may be identical with being moved.

Further, too, this movement may be effected by the soul — for example, feeling anger or fear may be the result of such and such a movement of the heart, and inference is either a movement of this sort or something else.

Some of these phenomena again may result from local movements, others from qualitative changes in a manner of which the details must be left for further inquiry.

Although, however, all this may be true, we must add that to speak of the soul as feeling angry is no more appropriate than to speak of the soul as weaving or building.

Perhaps, in fact, it is better to say not that the soul pities or learns or infers, but rather that the man does so through his soul.

Nor in saying that the man carries on these operations through his soul, must we take this to mean that the movement is in the soul, but simply that the movement sometimes advances towards soul, sometimes starts from it.

Sense perception, for example, starts from such and such individual things [and advances forward to the soul which reads them]: recollection on the other hand starts from the soul and terminates in the movements or impressions which are stored up in the organs of sense.

It must be remembered, too, that reason as a self-contained reality would seem to be implanted within the soul and would not seem to be destroyed with the dissolution of the body.

For, if it could be so destroyed, it would be so chiefly in consequence of the decay following in old age, whereas, as facts really stand, the case is perhaps parallel to that of the organs of sense, where we should allow that the old man, if he were to receive an eye fitted for vision, would see as well as the young man.

Thus old age is the result not of any affection sustained by the soul but by the medium in which it is contained, just as is also the case in drunkenness and in disease; and thinking and reflection are weakened on the destruction of something internal, but as for thought itself, it is unaffected by such accidents.

So also the processes of discursive understanding as also loving and hating are not affections of the reason but of the organism which possesses it, so far as it possesses it.

And hence it is that when this vehicle is destroyed, neither recollection nor love are longer possible, because these functions and feelings were not attributes of the reason but of that combination of soul and body which has perished.

Reason, however, is in all probability of a diviner character, and not subject to impressions from without.

It is evident then from these considerations that the soul cannot be in motion: and if motion is a predicate of it in no sense whatever, it evidently would not be moved either by itself.

Of all psychological theories the most unreasonable is that which describes soul as a number which sets itself in motion.

Such a view involves double impossibilities — firstly those resulting from its movement and more particularly those which spring from speaking of it as a number.

In what manner for instance, (1) are we to conceive a unit as moved — and by what means and under what conditions is it to be effected — seeing that it is devoid of parts and contains no differences, while if it be at once fitted to produce movement and also subject to movement it must exhibit points of difference?

(2) Further, it is a doctrine of the schools that the line when moved produces a superficies, and the point when moved creates a line.

Thus then since the point is merely a unit or monad possessing such and such a situation, and the number of the soul is no doubt somewhere and possesses a certain position, it follows that the movements of monads or units will be lines also [not souls or animate existences].

Besides (3) if we take away a number or unit from a number, it is another and a different number that is left: whereas plants and many animals live after they have been divided and are held to possess specifically the same and not a different soul.

Besides (4) there would appear to be no difference between speaking of monads or of infinitely small particles: if points be formed out of the globules of Democritus and quantity- alone remain, still there will be in this as in ever>'thing continuous, something moving on the one hand, something moved on the other; as this law is the result not of any difference in size but rests simply on the ground that the one object as the other is a quantity.

Thus then there must be something which will set the monads in motion.

But if it be soul which produces movement in the animal, it will be soul which does so also in the number: so that the soul is not at once the moving and the moved, but the moving factor only.

How then (5) can soul, being thus the moving factor only, be a monad?

Supposing it to be a monad, it must be different from other monads: but what difference can there be between one monadic point and another except position?

Thus then (6) if, on the one hand, the monads as also the points of the body are different from one another, still the monads will be in the same space as the latter — because each monad will occupy the room of a point.

But if two can be in the same place, what is there to prevent an endless number from being also in the same place?

This, however, is absurd; those objects of which the space is indivisible are themselves also indivisible.

If, on the other hand, the points in the body constitute the number of the soul, or if the soul be the number arising from the points in the body, why is it that all bodies do not possess a soul: seeing that there seems to be points in all of them even innumerable?

And further we may ask, (7) how is it possible for souls to be separated and released from the body, considering at any rjite that lines cannot be resolved into their points?