In addition to actually seeing and hearing, we perceive also that we see and that we hear.
We must then perceive that we see either by means of eye-sight itself or by some other sense.
In the latter case, however, there will be one and the same sense relating to the eye-sight and to the colour which is its object: and thus there must either be two senses concerned with one and the same object or the sense must itself possess the perception of itself And, further, even if the sense which thus perceives sight were different from sight itself, this would either involve another sense ad infinitum or there must at last be a sense which perceives its own action.
We must, therefore, ascribe this faculty of sense-perception to the original sense itself.
Here, however, a difficulty meets us.
To perceive anything by sight is, it may be said, to see: and it is colour, or what possesses colour, that is seen.
Hence, it may be thought, the original sense must, in order to perceive the seeing organ, possess colour also.
The difficulty so raised shews that perception by sight is not used in one single sense; even when we see nothing we are still able to distinguish by the eye-sight both darkness and light, though not, it is true, in the same manner.
Further, however, there is a sense in which the organ of sight may be said to be coloured: because the perceptive organ is in each case suited to receive the object of sense without the matter of which it is composed.
Hence in fact the reason why, even after the objects of sense have passed away, the perceptions and the images which represent them continue to subsist within the perceptive organs.
The object of sense is in fact, at the moment when it is perceived, identical with the actual exercise of sense-perception, although it is true the aspect which the former presents to us is different from that of the latter.
Thus it is, for example, with sound as actually expressed and hearing as actually exercised: one possessed of the sense of hearing need not actually hear, and that which is capable of producing sound need not be always actually sounding: it is only when that which is capable of hearing actually realizes itself, and that which is capable of sounding actually expresses sound, that at one and the same time hearing in full activity and sound in full activity are attained, so that there would be said to be hearing on the one side, sounding on the other.
Now, if it be in the object as it is being produced that both movement and productive action as well as receptivity take place, it follows that both actual sound and actual hearing must be contained in that which is potential: for it is in what is passive that the action of what is able to create and move displays itself โ a fact from which it follows as a corollary that the cause of movement need not itself be moved.
Thus then the actual expression of the sonorous is sound or sounding, the actualization of the capacity to hear is hearing as completed or in process: both sound and hearing being taken in a twofold sense.
The same account holds good also of other senses and their objects.
For just as creative action and passive receptivity are manifested in the subject which receives impressions, not in the object which produces them, so also the actualization at once of the object and of the faculty of sense lies in the faculty of sense.
Sometimes both states have names assigned them, as is the case with the terms 'sounding' and 'hearing': sometimes again the one or other is without a name.
Thus the actual exercise of sight is known as seeing, but the actual existence of colour when perceived has no distinctive name; and so similarly the actual operation of the gustatory faculty is known as tasting, while flavour, when actually felt, is without any characteristic name.
Thus then, since the object and the faculty of sense-perception are as actually operative fundamentally one, though differing in the aspect which they respectively present, it follows that hearing and sound when used in this sense must be destroyed and preserved together, and so also must it be with flavour and taste and with the object and the organ of the other senses; while, on the other hand, if object and organ be understood as in potentiality, there is no necessity that this should happen.
This relation of the object to the subject of sensation was not rightly comprehended by the early natural philosophers.
They thought that there was nothing white or black apart from vision, and no flavour independently of taste.
And in so thinking they were partly right, but they were also partly wrong.
For perception and its object are words employed in two senses, on the one hand as potential, on the other hand as actual: and although in the latter of these senses their assertion was correct, in the former it does not hold good.
They, however, maintained their doctrines without any qualification whatever, when they were really dealing with terms which are not employed in so unambiguous a manner.
[Perception does, however, always involve a close relation between the subject and the object, as may be seen by reference to sound and hearing.]
Harmony, it will be granted, is a species of vocal sound; and sound and hearing are in one sense identical (though it is true there is another sense in which they are not the same).
Now, since harmony is a ratio, hearing, it follows, must be also a sort of ratio.
This is in fact the reason why every excess, whether it be high or low, destroys hearing; just as similarly every excess in flavours destroys taste, every excess among colours, whether over-brilliant or overdark, destroys vision, or just again as all violent odours, whether sweet or bitter, destroy the sense of smell.
Perception, in fact, always involves a sort of ratio between the object and the faculty of sense.
Hence also it is that flavours are pleasant, when, being pure and unblended, they are combined in definite proportions, as is the case with what is piquant, or sweet, or, saltish โ flavours which are pleasant when combined in due proportions, and that in general the mixed and blended is attended with the greater pleasure.
Harmony, for example, brings us more pleasure than the single bass or treble, and to the sense of touch a moderate temperature is pleasanter than what is simply either hot or cold.
Sense-perception thus involves this relative proportion: while those objects which exceed this ratio either produce pain or destroy the action of sense.
Each single sense, we have before remarked, apprehends the object appropriated to it: and existing in its organ of sense as such it judges of the distinctions in the object which is subject to it eye-sight, for instance, judges of the white and black, taste of what is sweet and bitter, and so on.
But furthermore, we discriminate between what is white and what is sweet and between each of the objects of sense in comparison with every other: and thus the question rises, what is it which enables us to apprehend this difference?
It must be sense: because the qualities to be compared are objects of sense.
But if sense be the power which thus distinguishes the different qualities of objects.
It is evident that the mere fleshly organism is not the ultimate organ of sense-perception: because in that case the discriminating faculty would have to distinguish on merely coming into contact with the sensible object Thus then it is impossible for the senses taken apart from one another, to decide that what is (say) sweet is different from what is white: on the contrary, both the qualities must be exhibited to some one faculty.
It is just in fact as if I were to perceive the one and you the other; it would then be evident that our two perceptions are different from one another: but still it would be necessary to have some one referee to assert the difference: and just in the same way as such an assertion is made, do thought and perception also operate.
It is clear then that the separate senses cannot apart pass judgment on separate perceptions.
Nor, further, can such a judgment be passed at different times.
Just as it is one and the same principle which asserts that the good and bad are different, so further when it maintains the one to be different it also at the same time maintains the other to be so also.
Nor is this identity of time simply incidental: it is not, that is, as if its assertion were merely like saying " I at present assert the difference," without adding also that "the difference holds good at present" โ rather the one principle, which thus distinguishes both, maintains at present the difference, and maintains it to hold good at present: that is to say, it makes the two statements simultaneously; so that its judgment is inseparable, and made in a single inseparable moment of time.
But, it may be said, the same thing, cannot as undivided and within an undivided point of time be at one and the same time moved with contrary movements.
Yet if a quality be sweet it moves sense or thought in such and such a manner, while what is bitter does so in a contrary manner, and what is white must do so in a manner different from both.
Must not then the discriminating faculty be simultaneously on the one hand numerically one and undivided, but on the other hand separated in the mode of its existence } The truth is, there is a sense in which this distinguishing principle perceives what is divided as divided, while in another sense it does so as one undivided faculty; because while it is divided in its application or its mode of being, it is in regard of its seat of action and as viewed numerically one single undivided principle.
Or is this really impossible?
Potentially, it may be said, the same subject, and that one undivided, may present opposite qualities: but this cannot be the case with its definite existence; in its operation and working these characteristics are divided.
The same thing, in fact, cannot be at once black and white: and so, (/"perception and thought be nothing but a passive reception of such qualities, they cannot be impressed at one and the same time with the forms which represent these contraries.
To this objection it may be replied that the matter stands just as with the point (as some describe it), which, so far as it is one, may be regarded as undivided, while so far as it is two, it is divided.
So far then as the principle of judgment is undivided, so far it is one single faculty acting in one moment: so far as it shows itself divided, it uses the same point twice at two simultaneous times.
So far then as our faculty of discrimination makes use of the termination of this point as two, it distinguishes two qualities, and the objects are separated as the faculty is separated; while so far as it is one single faculty, it judges by one single act and within a single point of time.
Thus much on the principle through which, according to our view, the living being is endowed with powers of sense perception.