Sight then has for its object what is visible.
This visible itself is colour and something which may be described, although there is no one term by which to name it โ its nature will be evident as we proceed.
Meanwhile, let us repeat, the visible is colour.
This is that which diffuses itself over what is visible in itself, meaning by ' in itself not that it is so in its very conception, but that it contains within itself the reason of its being visible.
Now every colour is disposed to set in movement that which is actually pellucid, this being in fact its nature.
Hence colour is not visible without light: the colour on the contrary of every object is only visible in light.
And accordingly something must be said in the first place about the character of light.
There is then, we may begin by saying, something which is pellucid.
And by pellucid is meant something which is visible, not visible by itself (to speak without further qualification), but visible by reason of some foreign colour which affects its neutral pellucidity.
Of this character are air and water and also many among solid bodies, water and air being pellucid not in virtue of their qualities as water or air, but because they both contain the same element as constitutes the everlasting empyrean essence.
Light then is the expression of this pellucid qua pellucid: and whenever this pellucidity is present only potentially, there darkness also is present.
Light is thus almost as it were the colour of the pellucid when it is realized into full pellucidity by fire or something like the upper substance of the heavens, this upper substance possessing one and the same element with fire.
Thus then we have described pellucidity and light: and have shewn light to be neither fire, nor body generally, nor even the effluvium or emanation from any body (since even in this case it would be a body of a kind) but only the presence of fire or something like it in that which is pellucid: two bodies being unable to exist at one and the same time within the same space.
This explanation of light is confirmed by the ordinary view which regards light as the opposite of darkness.
Darkness in fact is really the removal of such a positive quality from what is pellucid, so that light must necessarily be its presence.
Empedocles therefore and any others who have followed him have not described the phenomenon correctly in speaking of the light as moving itself and as coming some time or other, without our knowing it, into existence between the earth and the surrounding air.
Such a theory is contrary at once to reason and to experience.
Within the limits of a narrow space, such a process might escape our observation: but to imply that it should do so from the rising to the setting sun is to make too great a postulate.
It is in fact the colourless which is receptive of colour, just as it is the soundless which is receptive of sound.
But such an absence of colour is characteristic of the pellucid and of the invisible or what is scarcely visible (as darkness is generally thought to be).
And the pellucid itself is also similarly dark, but it is so not when it is pellucid in actuality, but only so potentially: for it is one and the same element which is at one time darkness, at another time light.
It must not however be supposed that light is exclusively the condition of seeing things: it is so only for the peculiar colour of each object.
There are in fact some things which are not visible in the light, but admit of being perceived in darkness, as for instance those phosphorescent objects which cannot be denoted by any one single name, but are such things as fungi, horns, fish-heads, scales and eyes โ but in none of these is the colour specially belonging to them perceived in darkness.
The reason of this is matter for another argument: at present this much is clear that what is perceived in light is colour.
Colour therefore is not visible without the presence of light: this indeed we saw was the essential character of colour that it is calculated to set the actually pellucid in movement: and the full play of this pellucid constitutes light.
It is an obvious proof of the existence of this pellucid that if the object be placed close upon the very eye, this object will not be seen.
The colour in fact moves the pellucid substance, for instance the air, and it is only through this as it extends from the object to the sense that motion can be communicated to the visual organ.
Democritus is therefore not at all correct in thinking, as he does, that if the intermediate space were empty, everything would be fully seen, even an ant should there be one in the sky.
This is really an impossibility.
Vision is the result of some impression made upon the faculty of sense: an impression which cannot be effected by the colour itself as perceived; and must therefore be due to the medium which inter\'enes.
An intervening substance then of one kind or another there must necessarily be: and were this inter\'ening space made empty, not only will the object not be seen exactly, but it will not be perceived at all.
We have thus shewn why colour must be seen in light Fire is seen under both conditions, both in darkness and in light: and this necessarily: for it is by means of fire that the potentially pellucid becomes so actually.
This same account holds good likewise of sound and smell.
Neither produces perception by actual contact with the organ: the scent and the sound move the intervening medium: and this medium moves in turn each of the two sense-organs.
Thus, in this case also, if the sonorous or odorous object be placed close upon the organ itself, it will produce no perception.
Nor is this true only of these senses: it is really the case with touch and taste as well, though apparently it is not so โ a fact of which the reason will be afterwards evident.
This intervening medium is in the case of sound air, in the case of smell it is some element found both in air and water which has no name assigned it, but which, just as the pellucid serves as medium in the case of colour, so in the case of what possesses smell is present as a common quality in both of these.
And thus it is that even animals which live in water seem to possess the sense of smell: man and all other animals that breathe cannot smell unless when inhaling air.
The reason of this will be stated afterwards: for the present we must first proceed to determine the nature of sound and hearing.