De Anima

Aristotle · edition credit: Edwin Wallace

Book 3, reading section 4

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We must next discuss the cognitive and thinking part of soul, whether it be separated from our other mental faculties or whether it is not separated physically, but be so only by thought and abstraction, and inquire what is the specific character of thought, and how it is that at some stage or another thought begins to operate.

Thinking, we may assume, is like perception, and, if so, consists in being affected by the object of thought or in something else of this nature.

Like sense then, thought or reason must be not entirely passive, but receptive of the form — that is, it must be potentially like this form, but not actually identical with it: it will stand, in fact, towards its objects in the same relation as that in which the faculty of sense stands towards the objects of perception.

Reason therefore, since it thinks everything must be free from all admixture, in order that, to use the phrase of Anaxagoras, it may rule the world — that is, acquire knowledge: for the adjacent light of any foreign body obstructs it and eclipses it Its very nature, then, is nothing but just this comprehensive potentiality: and the reason — that is, that function through which the soul is ratiocinative and frames notions — is therefore, previously to the exercise of thought, actually identical with nothing which exists.

This consideration shews how improbable it is that reason should be incorporated with the bodily organism: for if so, it would be of some definite character, either hot or cold, or it would have some organ for its operation, just as is the case with sense.

But, as matter of fact, reason has nothing of this character.

There is truth, too, in the view of those who say the soul is the source of general ideas: only it is soul not as a whole but in its faculty of reason: and the forms or ideas in question exist within the mind, not as endowments which we already possess, but only as capacities to be developed.

The difference, however, between the impassivity of the faculty of reason and of the faculty of sense is clear from a consideration of the organs and the processes of sense-perception.

Sense, for example, is unable to acquire perception from an object which is in too great excess — cannot, to take an instance, perceive sound from extremely loud noises, nor see nor smell anything from too violent colours and odours.

Reason, on the contrary, when it applies itself to something extremely intellectual, does not lessen but rather increases its power of thinking inferior objects, the explanation being that the faculty of sense is not independent of the body, whereas reason is separated from it.

And since reason becomes each of its objects in the sense in which he who is in actual possession of knowledge is described as knowing — this resulting when he can apply his knowledge by himself — the reason as a developed capacity is similar to what it was previously as a mere unformed faculty though not the same as what it was before it learned or discovered: and it may in this final stage be said to think itself.

[The difference between sense and reason may be exhibited also in this manner.]

There is a difference between magnitude as a simple fact and magnitude as a real notion, just as there is between water and its essential being: as indeed a similar difference holds good in most things, though not in all, there being some abstract objects in which matter and form combine together into one.

It is then either by a different faculty, or by a faculty differently applied, that the mind judges of the essential nature of flesh and simple flesh itself, because flesh does not exist independently of matter, but is, like snubnosedness, a definite fact in concrete expression.

With the faculty of sense it discriminates the hot and cold and those qualities of which flesh presents us with a certain aspect, whereas with another faculty, either separated from the former or standing to it in the same relation as the bent line to the same line when straightened, it judges of the essential notion of flesh.

And this distinction holds good also of abstract conceptions.

The actual straight line, as occupying continuous space, resembles the concrete materially expressed snubnose; whereas the essential idea, if we allow a difference between the notion of straightness and the simple straight line, must be recognised by some other faculty.

And now suppose that we define the idea of straightness as duality.

It must be with a different or differently applied faculty that mind judges of this real idea: and generally just as the forms of sense can be separated from the matter in which they are embodied, so also can we draw a distinction between the different applications of thought.

The question might, however, here be raised — How, if reason is uncompounded and unaffected by impressions, and has, as Anaxagoras maintains, no community with other objects — how is it to think objects, if thinking be a sort of receptivity; for it is only in so far as there is something common to two objects that the one is thought to produce, the other to receive an impression.

And the further question might be raised whether reason itself can be an object of thought For either reason must be an attribute of other things as well, in case it be held to be an object of thought not through anything outside itself, but simply in and by itself, and supposing that the object of thought is always something homogeneous: or it must have some element compounded with it which makes it capable of being thought like other real things.

Or may we not rather hold that the receptivity of reason is possible only in virtue of some common element?

And hence it has been already said that reason is in a way potentially one with the ideas of reason, though it is actually nothing but a mere capacity before the exercise of thought.

We must suppose, in short, that the process of thought is like that of writing on a writing-tablet on which nothing is yet actually written.

Thus the reason can be thought just in the same way as can objects of thought generally.

[For such objects of thought are either immaterial or material.]

Now in the case of immaterial objects, the subject thinking and the object thought are one and the same: just as speculative science is equivalent to the objects and ideas of speculative knowledge (a fact, it is true, which leaves the question — why we do not always think, to be investigated).

In the case, on the contrary, of those objects which are imbedded in matter, each of the ideas of reason is present, if only potentially and implicitly.

And thus reason is not to be regarded as belonging to and governed by the things of sense (reason being a faculty independent of the matter of such objects), but the world of thought must be regarded as belonging to and regulated by reason.