We will now sum up the conclusions we have made about the soul.
The soul, we have seen, is in a way all existing things.
For the objects of existence are either objects of sense or objects of thought: and while science is in a way identical with the objects of thought, sense again is one with the objects of sense.
How this comes about is a point we must investigate.
Scientific thought and sense-perception thus spread themselves over objects, potential sense and science relating to things potential, actual to things actual.
Now the sensitive and the scientific faculty in the soul are potentially these objects — that is to say, the objects of scientific thought on the one hand, the objects of sense on the other.
It must be then either the things themselves or their forms with which they are identical.
The things themselves, however, they are not: it is not the stone, but simply the form of the stone, that is in the soul.
The soul, therefore, is like the hand: for just as the hand is the instrument through which we grasp other instruments, so also reason is the form through which we apprehend other forms, while sense-perception is the form of the objects of sense.
[The forms of reason are not however something different from the things of sense.]
As there is, according to the common opinion, no object outside the magnitudes of sense, it follows that the ideas of reason are contained in the forms of sense, both the so-called abstract conceptions and the various qualities and attributes that determine sensible phenomena.
And further, without the aid of sense-perception we never come to learn or understand anything: and whenever we consider something in the mind, we must at the same time contemplate some picture of the imagination: for the pictures of the imagination correspond to the impressions of the senses, except that the former are without material embodiment.
At the same time imagination is something different from affirmation and negation, for it is only by a combination of ideas that we attain to truth and falsehood.
But, it may be asked, in what respect will our primary ideas differ from mere images of sense?
And to this, perhaps, we may reply that they are, as little as other ideas which we frame, mere images of sense, although never framed without the help of such representative images.