De Anima

Aristotle ยท edition credit: Edwin Wallace

Book 2, reading section 1

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The psychological theories of earlier thinkers have occupied us hitherto.

We will now take up the subject as it were afresh, and attempt to determine what soul is, and what is the most comprehensive definition that can be given of it.

Real substance is the name which we assign one class of existing things; and this real substance may be viewed from several aspects, either, firstly y as matter, meaning by matter that which in itself is not any individual thing; or secondly y as form and specific characteristic in virtue of which an object comes to be described as such and such an individual; or thirdly^ as the result produced by a combination of this matter and this form.

Further, while matter is merely potential existence, the form is perfect realization (a conception which may be taken in two forms, either as resembling knowledge possessed or as corresponding to observation in active exercise).

These real substances again are thought to correspond for the most part with bodies, and more particularly with natural bodies, because these latter are the source from which other bodies are formed.

Now among such natural bodies, some have, others do not have life, meaning here by life the process of nutrition, increase and decay from an internal principle.

Thus every natural body possessed of life would be a real substance, and a substance which we may describe as composite.

Since then the body, as possessed of life, is of this compound character, the body itself would not constitute the soul: for body is not [like life and soul] something attributed to a subject; it rather acts as the underlying subject and the material basis.

Thus then the soul must necessarily be a real substance, as the form which determines a natural body possessed potentially of life.

The reality however of an object is contained in its perfect realization.

Soul therefore will be a perfect realization of a body such as has been described.

Perfect realization however is a word used in two senses: it may be understood either as an implicit state corresponding to knowledge as possessed, or as an explicitly exercised process corresponding to active observation.

Here, in reference to soul, it must evidently be understood in the former of these two senses: for the soul is present with us as much while we are asleep as while we are awake; and while waking resembles active observation, sleep resembles the implicit though not exercised possession of knowledge.

Now in reference to the same subject, it is the implicit knowledge of scientific principles which stands prior.

Soul therefore is the earlier or implicit perfect realization of a natural body possessed potentially of life.

Such potential life belongs to everything which is possessed of organs.

Organs however, we must remember, is a name that applies also to the parts of plants, except that they are altogether uncompounded.

Thus the leaf is the protection of the pericarp and the pericarp of the fruit; while the roots are analogous to the mouth in animals, both being used to absorb nourishment.

Thus then, if we be required to frame some one common definition, which will apply to every form of soul, it would be that soul is the earlier perfect realization of a natural organic body.

The definition we have just given should make it evident that we must no more ask whether the soul and the body are one, than ask whether the wax and the figure impressed upon it are one, or generally inquire whether the material and that of which it is the material are one; for though unity and being are used in a variety of senses, their most distinctive sense is that of perfect realization.

A general account has thus been given of the nature of the soul: it is, we have seen, a real substance which expresses an idea.

Such a substance is the manifestation of the inner meaning of such and such a body.

Suppose, for example, that an instrument such as an axe were a natural body: then its aixehood or its being an axe would constitute its essential nature or reality, and thus, so to speak, its soul; because were this axehood taken away from it, it would be no longer an axe, except in so far as It might still be called by this same name.

The object in question, however, is as matter of fact only an axe; soul being not the idea and the manifestation of the meaning of a body of this kind, but of a natural body possessing within itself a cause of movement and of rest

The theory just stated should be viewed also in reference to the separate bodily parts.

If, for example, the eye were possessed of life, vision would be its soul: because vision is the reality which expresses the idea of the eye.

The eye itself, on the other hand, is merely the material substratum for vision: and when this power of vision fails, it no longer remains an eye, except in so far as it is still called by the same name, just in the same way as an eye carved in stone or delineated in painting is also so described.

Now what holds good of the part must be applied to the living body taken as a whole: for perception as a whole stands to the whole sensitive body, as such, in the same ratio as the particular exercise of sense stands to a single organ of sense.

The part of our definition which speaks of something as " potentially possessed of life " must be taken to mean not that which has thrown off its soul, but rather that which has it: the seed and the fruit is such and such a body potentially.

In the same way then as cutting is the full realization of an axe, or actual seeing the realization of the eye, so also waking may be said to be the full realization of the body: but it is in the sense in which vision is not only the exercise but also the implicit capacity of the eye that soul is the true realization of the body.

The body on the other hand is merely the material to which soul gives reality: and just as the eye is both the pupil and its vision, so also the living animal is at once the soul and body in connection.

It is not then difficult to see that soul or certain parts of it (if it naturally admit of partition) cannot be separated from the body: for in some cases the soul is the realization of the parts of body themselves.

It is however perfectly conceivable that there may be some parts of it which are separable and this because they are not the expression or realization of any particular body.

And indeed it is further matter of doubt whether soul as the perfect realization of the body may not stand to it in the same separable relation as a sailor to his boat

This much may suffice as a description and sketch of the nature of the soul.