De Anima

Aristotle ยท edition credit: Edwin Wallace

Book 2, reading section 10

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Taste has for its object something tangible, and, for this reason, it is perceived as little as the object of touch through the medium of any foreign body.

And the substance in which flavour lies โ€” that is to say, the gustable โ€” is contained in what is moist as its material substratum, and the moist itself is something tangible.

Thus, were we in the water, and were any thing sweet cast into it, we should perceive it, the perception in this case being the result, not of the intervening medium, but simply of the mingling of the sweet thing with the water, as is the case with what we drink.

Colour, however, is not perceived by a similar process of combination nor by emanation.

Here then, in regard to taste, there is nothing corresponding to a mediating substance, but, on the other hand, as the object of vision is colour, so the object of taste is flavour.

Now nothing produces the sense of flavour without moisture; everything that does so, possesses moisture either actually or potentially.

So it is, for instance, with the saltish; for it is easily dissolved and it readily combines with the moisture of the tongue.

[In its objects, taste is as comprehensive as sight or hearing.]

Sight, we saw, is concerned at once with the visible and invisible (darkness, for instance, is invisible, but is nevertheless distinguished by the eyesight), and also with the excessively bright, which is likewise invisible, though in another manner than darkness.

Hearing, in like manner, perceives both sound and silence (of which the one is audible, the other inaudible), and is also directed to excessive noise, just as sight dealt with the overbrilliant, great and violent noise being inaudible much in the same way as the slight and feeble.

And here further it should be noted that the name invisible is used not only to denote that which is absolutely and entirely so, in the manner in which we use the word impossible in other cases; it denotes also that which does not possess its normal qualities or possesses them only imperfectly, as we speak of something as without feet or without kernel.

Taste then, has in this same way a perception at once of the sapid and the insipid, meaning by this last that which has a small and feeble flavour or a flavour which destroys taste altogether.

Of this distinction the drinkable and undrinkable is thought to be the origin, for taste embraces both, although there is this difference, that the one is destructive and injurious to the taste, while the other is naturally adapted to it.

And the potable or drinkable is common at once to touch and taste.

The object of taste being liquid, it follows that the organ which perceives it must be neither actually moist nor yet incapable of being rendered moist: for the taste is affected in some way by the object of taste as such.

Hence it is necessary that the organ of taste which admits of being moistened should be rendered moist without losing anything of its own nature and without being moistened in itself.

This is confirmed by the fact that the tongue has no sense of taste when it is either very dry or very moist: for in this latter case, it is the moisture with which the tongue has been previously imbued that is touched, rather than the flavour applied to it that is tasted.

The case, in fact, is just like what happens when one, after having tasted beforehand some strong flavour, proceeds to taste some other substance, or to the way in which everything seems bitter to the sick because the tongue with which they taste is filled with flavour of this bitter character.

The specific kinds of flavours are, as in the case of colours, firstly simple opposites, viz. the sweet and bitter: secondly, the flavours allied to each of these โ€” i.e. the oily and the saltish: thirdly, the flavours intermediate between these, viz. the pungent, the rough, the astringent and the piquant: these being in fact the different flavours which are generally recognised.

Thus then the faculty of taste is that which is potentially of this character: the object of taste is that which makes it actually so.