Touch and its object may be considered in the same way.
Thus if touch be not one single sense but a variety of senses, the objects of touch must be also several.
And it is in fact a question whether the sense of touch includes several senses or whether it is one sense only, as also what is the organ which is adapted to perceive the tangible, whether, e.g., it is the flesh and in the case of other animals some corresponding part, or whether, on the other hand, this is merely the inter\-ening medium, the ultimate organ of sense being something else which is within.
For, while all the other senses are held to be related to some pair of opposites โ sight, for example being directed to the white and black, hearing to the acute and grave, taste to the bitter and the sweet โ the object of touch presents us with many pairs of opposites โ such as hot and cold, dr\' and moist, hard and soft, and others of like character.
A partial solution of this difficulty lies in the consideration that in the case of the other senses also there are several pairs of opposites.
Thus in sound we recognise not only the high or low pitch of the notes, but also their strength and weakness, their roughness and their smoothness, and so forth.
Colour similarly has a number of different aspects.
Still this consideration does not let us see what is the one common object falling to the sense of touch as sound falls under hearing.
Another question which suggests itself with reference to touch is whether its organ is within, or whether it is not within, but is immediately the flesh.
No conclusion can be drawn from the fact that the perception of touch takes place simultaneously with actual contact.
If we were to frame a membrane-like substance and stretch it over the flesh, we should still, no less than before, perceive the object immediately after touching it.
Yet it is evident the organ of sense is not contained within this: and of course if the membrane were naturally united with the flesh, the perception would pass through it still more rapidly.
This part then of the body seems to be related to us much in the same way as if air were to encircle us about: we should then be thought to perceive both sound and colour and odour by one single medium, and sight, hearing and smell would be regarded as but one single sense.
Now however, as matters stand, by reason of the difference in the organs by which the movements are effected, the organs of sense which we have mentioned are clearly seen to be different from one another.
W'^ith regard to touch, however, this point is obscure.
For it is impossible that the animate body which feels touch should be composed of air or water, seeing that it must be something compact.
It remains then that it should be compounded of earth and such like elements as the flesh and its counterpart is understood to be.
The body then must be simply the natural medium for the sense of touch, as the means by which its sensations, which are several in number, are communicated.
The multiplicity of these sensations is shewn by the sense of touch located in the tongue: for here at one and the same part is located the sense at once of all tangible objects and of flavour.
Were then the rest of the flesh to perceive flavour also, taste and touch would appear to be one and the same: whereas, as matters stand, they are actually two, because the organs of the one sense cannot take the place of those of the other.
There is a question which might be started here.
Every body, it will be granted, possesses depth, that is, is of the third dimension, and two bodies with some third body between them can never come into contact with one another.
Now neither the moist nor the fluid can exist independently of water: they must either be or have water.
But those objects which touch one another in water, seeing that the edges are not dry, must necessarily have between them water with which the extremities are filled.
If however this be true, then it is impossible for one object really to be in contact with another in water, and the same thing holds good with objects in the air: the air standing in the same relation to the objects in it as that in which water stands to the objects in water, although we rather fail to notice, just like aquatic animals, whether the fluid touches on the fluid.
The question then naturally arises whether there is one mode of sensation for all objects equally, or whether different kinds of objects are perceived in different manners.
Popular thought accepts the latter view, and holds that the perceptions of touch and taste take place through immediate contact with their object, while the other senses operate at a distance.
This however is not really the case.
We really perceive both the hard and soft through media, just as we also do the sonorous, the visible, and odorous: the only difference being that in the one case the objects are further off, in the other case more close at hand.
And thus, by reason of the close proximity, the fact escapes our notice, the real truth being that we perceive all objects through the intervention of some medium, although we fail to observe it in the senses we have mentioned.
Yet, as we said before, were we to perceive all the objects of touch through a membrane of whose intervention we were unconscious, we should be in the same condition as we are in now both in water and in air, in which we imagine ourselves to touch the very objects themselves, and think of no intervening medium.
There is, however, this difference between the object of touch and the objects of sight and sound, that, in the case of the latter, perception is the result of some action on the part of the medium towards us, whereas in regard to the objects of touch we perceive not by means of, but along with the medium; just like a man who has been struck through his shield, where it is not the shield which by being struck has hit the man, but the two which have been struck together.
Altogether, in short, the flesh and tongue seem to stand in the same relation to touch as that in which air and water do to sight, hearing, and smell.
In the one case too, as little as in the other, would perception ensue on direct contact with the organ of sensation, as for instance by placing a white object on the very extremity of the eye.
From this it is evident that the organ of touch is internal.
For the same thing must happen in regard to touch as in regard to other senses.
There, when anything is placed upon the actual organ, no perception follows; it is however perceived when placed upon the flesh, and hence, we may infer, it is the flesh which serves as medium for the sense of touch.
It is then the different qualities of body qua body that are apprehended by the touch; such qualities being those which distinguish the different elements, viz. hot and cold, dry and moist, concerning which we have spoken before now in our Treatise on the Elements.
And the organ fitted to perceive them by the touch and that in which what is called touch primarily inheres is a part which is in capacity what the objects of touch are in full actuality.
For perception is a sort of passive impression, and thus the object which is acting makes the organ, which is potentially the same with it, to be actually so as well.
Thus we do not perceive that which is hot or cold, or hard or soft to the same degree as we ourselves are, while we perceive the states that pass into extremes, sense-perception being as it were a sort of mean between the opposition in the things of sense.
And hence it is that sense discriminates its objects; that which occupies the mean judging of the two extremes because it becomes for each of them its opposite.
And just as that which is to perceive the white and black must be actually neither of them but potentially both, as is similarly the case with the other senses, so also, in the special case of touch, it should be neither hot nor cold.
Touch, again, is occupied at once with the tangible and the intangible, just as we saw that eye-sight was in a way perceptive both of the visible and the invisible and that the other senses equally applied themselves to opposites.
By the intangible must here be understood both that which presents too slight differences to be discriminated by touch, (for instance, air,) and also those objects of touch which are in such excess as to be destructive of all sense-perception.
A sketch has thus been given of the separate senses.