De Anima

Aristotle · edition credit: Edwin Wallace

Book 3, reading section 1

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The five senses just enumerated — sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch — would seem to comprise all our perceptive faculties and to leave no further sense to be explained.

The following considerations will help to make this clear.

Let it be granted that we, as matters stand, perceive everything of which touch is the appropriate sense, since all the properties of the tangible as such are perceived by us through touch: and let it be allowed, further, that the absence of any faculty of sense-perception involves the absence of the corresponding organ.

Now all those objects which are naturally known by actual contact are perceived through the sense of touch, and this we actually possess: those objects, on the other hand, which are known through media without contact on our part, are perceived through the elements such as air and water.

(Thus if several objects of sense, different in kind from one another, are perceived through one such element, it follows of necessity that any one possessing one such organ must have the power also of perceiving both qualities: so that for instance, if the organ is composed of air, and air is the medium both of sound and colour, the one organ will perceive both qualities.

If, on the other hand, there be several elements acting as media to one and the same object — for instance, both air and water, as being both pellucid, act as media for colour — the possession of one only of these media will ensure the perception of that which can be seen through one or other medium.)

Now it is from these two alone among the elements — that is, air and water — that the organs of sense are constructed.

(Thus the pupil of the eye consists of water: the organ of hearing is composed of air: the sense of smell depends on one or other of these two.)

As for fire, on the other hand, it is either a constituent in no one of the organs of sense or it is a common element in all, as there is no faculty of sense which can act independently of heat; and as regards earth, it is either present in none, of the organs, or it is chiefly incorporated in a special manner with the touch.

Hence then no element is left to act as an organ of sense-perception outside air and water.

Now, as matter of fact, several animals do possess the organs so constituted.

Thus, then, we may venture to conclude, all the senses are possessed by those animals which are not imperfect nor mutilated; even the mole is found to have eyes underneath its skin.

And thus, unless there exist bodies differing from those we know, and unless there are properties of substances which are found in none of those around us, it would follow that no sense whatever can be wanting to us.

Nor can there, in the next place, be any one special organ for those common properties which we perceive in connection with each perception — such properties, viz., as movement, rest, figure, magnitude, number and unity.

All of these are perceived as some modification or other of movement.

Thus, for instance, niagnitude is perceived in connection with such movement, and this also is the case with figure (a kind of magnitude) while rest is perceived by the absence of movement.

Number, on the other hand, is apprehended by the negation of continuity, as also by the individual senses, because the object of each sensation is a unit.

It is, therefore, clearly impossible that there should be any one particular sense attached to any of these forms, as for instance movement.

Were there in fact such a special sense appropriated to the common sensibles, we should perceive them only in the way in which we now perceive something to be sweet through seeing it — because, that is, we happen to possess from past experience a perception of two qualities united in one object, and thereby, when the two qualities coexist, we know them together.

Apart, indeed, from such co-existence of the two qualities, we should have no perception of them except incidentally, just as we know the son of Cleon, not as such, but as a white object, to which it is an incidental concomitant, to be the son of Cleon.

But when we reach the common sensibles we find we have a common perception of them which enters into all the senses, not a perception incidentally united with some single sense.

There is, therefore, no one special sense assigned to the common properties of objects of sensation; for were there only such a special sense, we should never perceive them except in that incidental manner in which, as has been said, we see through something white the son of Cleon.

At the same time, the faculties of sense do perceive the qualities that belong to adjacent senses incidentally, but they do so not as separate senses in themselves, but in so far as they meet in one, when one perception takes place simultaneously with another in regard to the same object.

It is, for instance, in this manner that sense perceives gall to be both bitter and yellow: it is not the part of any separate sense to say that both qualities are in union: this, indeed, is just the reason why people are deceived, and led to suppose that if a fluid be yellow it must be gall.

The question may now be raised, why is it that we have several senses, and not one only, in order to perceive these common properties of sense } The reason may be that it is to prevent the common qualities associated with particular sensations, such as motion, magnitude, and number, escaping possibly our observation.

Were sight the only sense which we possessed, restricted, say, for instance, to white colour, all other qualities would readily escape our notice, and would be' thought to be the same with the reports of particular sensations, in consequence of the manner in which such qualities as colour and magnitude accompany each other.

On the other hand, with the arrangement which prevails, the presence of the common qualities in other objects of sensation makes it evident that each of them is different.