De Anima

Aristotle · edition credit: Edwin Wallace

Book 2, reading section 12

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The general character of sense in all its forms is to be found in seeing that sense-perception is that which is receptive of the forms of things sensible without their matter, just in the same way as wax receives the impress of the seal without the iron or the gold of which it is composed and takes the figure of the gold or bronze but at the same time not as bronze or gold.

Similarly, sense receives the impress of each object that possesses colour, or flavour, or sound, not however, in so far as each of them is such and such a definite individual, but rather so far as it is of such and such a general character, and relatively to its notion.

An organ of sense-perception then is reached so soon as any part displays this power of apprehending the general character of objects.

And thus the organ and the faculty of sense are essentially and fundamentally the same, although they manifest themselves in different ways; otherwise in fact, the faculty perceiving would be as it were a sort of magnitude: whereas neither the essential character of perception nor the faculty of sense can be described as a magnitude — rather it is a power to read the essential notion of the object.

These considerations shew why sentient impressions in excess destroy the organ of sense.

The reason is that if the movement of the organ of sense be too strong, the relation, which, as we have seen, sense involves, is broken, much in the same manner as harmony and tone become discordant when the strings are violently struck.

The same fact explains also why plants possess no sense-perception although they have a psychic element and are impressed in some degree by things tangible, becoming, as they do, both hot and cold.

The reason is that they do not possess that faculty (which sense implies) of acting as a mean between extremes, and have no fundamental capacity for receiving the form only of the things of sense: but that on the contrary, at the same time as they receive the form of anything, they receive the matter likewise.

The question might be further raised whether that which is without the sense of smell could be affected by odour, or that which is without the faculty of vision by colour, and so on, in like cases.

In answer to this we may reply that if the object of smell be odour, it is the sense of smell (if anything) which odour calls into exercise; and therefore none of those objects that are without the faculty of smell can be affected by odour, (the same account being given also of the other senses); nor indeed can any of those objects which have the faculties of sense perceive anything except -in so far as they have some particular sensitive capacity.

The matter will be clear also in the following manner.

Neither light, nor darkness, nor sound, nor smell, can produce any effect on bodies, although the substance in which they are contained may do so, just as it is the air which accompanies thunder that breaks up trees.

Tangible qualities, however, and flavours do themselves act on bodies; other\vise, in fact, by what would things inanimate be affected and altered?

Will not then, it may be said, other sensible qualities act also in this manner?

Or is the truth this — that every body cannot be affected by smell and sound; and those objects which are affected by them (as, for instance, air,) are indefinite and shifting: for the air gives out odour as if it had been subject to an impression.

What then, it may be said, is smell but an impression of this same kind?

And to this we must reply that smelling over and beyond this mere impression means perceiving, whereas the impression of the air only makes it quickly perceptible.