De Anima

Aristotle · edition credit: Edwin Wallace

Book 1, reading section 5

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There are then, as we have said, two consequences of this doctrine of the soul.

On the one hand its supporters are brought to maintain a view identical with those who regard soul as some subtle body, while, on the other hand, they are landed in the peculiar absurdity which Democritus fell into in explaining how the body is moved by the soul.

For if there be a soul in every sentient body, there must be two bodies within the same body, supposing the mind is a body of some sort or other: those, on the other hand, who say it is a number must either allow many points to exist within one point or else allow every body to possess a soul, unless the number be introduced as differing from other numbers and from the points existing in the body.

It follows also that the living creature is moved by number much in the same way as we said Democritus moved it.

For what difference does it make whether we speak of the movement of small globes or of large monads or of monads generally in movement.

In either case the movement of the animal must be the result of the moving of these elements.

These and many other like consequences meet those who have combined together movement and number into one conception.

Such a conception can not only not be the definition of soul: it cannot even be regarded as a concomitant attribute of it.

This is evident when we attempt to explain by reference to such a notion the feelings and functions of the soul, as for instance, its ratiocinations, perceptions, pleasures, pains, &c.: as we said before, it is not even easy by the help of the imagination to conjecture from it what would be their character.

Thus then we have gone through the difficulties and objections which may be raised against two of the three methods of defining soul which have been transmitted to us.

Some we have seen have regarded it as the most mobile element because it possesses the power of moving itself: others have viewed it as a body of the subtlest and the finest parts or as the most incorporeal of all other bodies.

It remains to examine the sense in which it is said to be compounded of the different elements.

The object of this conception of the soul is, say its supporters, to explain how it can perceive the objects of existence and gain knowledge of each individual thing.

A number of impossibilities, however, necessarily follow on this doctrine.

It assumes, to begin with, that like is known by like, thus identifying, as it were, the soul with the things it knows.

Our objects of knowledge however include not only elements but many other things besides, and, what is perhaps still more worthy of notice, the things compounded of these elements are unlimited in number.

Now granting that the soul knows and perceives in the way described the elements from which each of these is formed, still, we may ask, by which will it know or perceive the concrete whole, as for example what is God or man or flesh or bone, and similarly any composite object.

The different elements do not seem to compose each of these objects in any way whatever but according to a certain ratio and adjustment, as Empedocles himself says with respect to bone.

Then did the earth the productive within the huge furnace primeval

Gain out of eight parts two of the liquid transparently crystal;

Four parts came from the fire; and the bones white came to existence.

Obviously then there is no good in the elements being present in the soul, unless the ratios and the different adaptations be present also; for although each element may recognise its similar, still it will acquire no knowledge of a bone or of a human being.

Unless these be present within it also.

It. need hardly be/said however that this is quite impossible: who could question whether such an object as a stone or man is present in the soul?

And the same thing may be said of the good and not "'good, as also in other cases.

Being, it may be objected further, is a term used, in various senses: it indicates now concrete substance, now quantity or quality, or it may be some other of the categories as they are distinguished.

Is soul then, it may be asked, to be composed of all the categories or not?

To the former supposition it may be at once replied that there are no elements which are common to all the categories.

Does then, we may ask, the soul consist merely of the elements that fall under the category of ' substance?

In that case, how does it come to have knowledge of each also of the other categories?

Will it be said that every category of being has its own elements and appropriate principles and that the soul consists of these?

The result then will be that the soul will have to be a quantity and quality as well .as a substance.

But out of the elements of quantity it is impossible that a substance should be formed: only a quantity can arise from elements of quantity.

Such are the difficulties as well as others of a similar character involved in holding that the Soul consists of all the elements.

It is a further inconsistency in the supporters of this doctrine that, while asserting that like perceives like and that we know like by like, they maintain that like is unaffected by like, and at the same time explain perception as a kind of affection and of being moved, and treat thinking and cognition in a similar fashion.

There are in. fact many difficulties and perplexities involved in saying with Empedocles that everything is known through the corporeal elements and that the similar is apprehended by the similar — as is especially attested by the fact that all those parts within the bodies of animals, which are composed of earth simply-^as for example bones, sinews, hairs — are held to perceive nothing and thus not even those things which are like them^-although according to the theory they should.

It maybe added further that each one of the elemental principles will have much more ignorance than understanding: because while each element will know some individual object, it will be ignorant of many; as in fact it will be ignorant of everything else outside this one.

Nay in fact Empedocles has to face the conclusion that God is most destitute of understanding: for he alone will have no knowledge of one among the elements — viz. strife, although all things mortal will possess this, because they are each compounded out of all the elements.

There is, besides, a general inconsistency which may be brought against the theory.

Why is it on this supposition that all objects of existence do not possess a soul?

Every one of them is either an element or formed from some one element or from several or all of them; and such objects must necessarily know one thing or some or all.

The question might besides be raised, what is it that brings the elements to unity?

The elements themselves resemble mere unformed matter, and it is the synthetic force, whatever it may be, which is most important Now it is impossible that there should be anything superior to soul or dominating it: and still more impossible that there should be anything superior to reason: for reason, it is to be believed, is by nature first born and supreme.

And yet the philosophers in question make the elements the first forms of existence.

A general objection which may be brought both against those who, because the soul perceives and knows things existing, describe it as formed from the elements, and also against those who make it the most mobile principle, is that their statement does not apply to every form of soul.

Sentient beings are not in every case capable of movement: some animals in fact appear to be stationary in place: although at the same time this is thought to be the only form of movement by which soul 'moves' the animal.

A like objection falls on those who construct reason and the faculty of sense out of the elements: for plants [of which their theory takes no account, although compounded of the elements] appear to live without partaking in locomotion or sensation, and there are many animals which appear to have no powers of discursive reasoning.

But even if this be granted and reason as well as the faculty of sense regarded as parts only of the soul, not even then should we have a general statement made respecting every soul or even respecting the whole of one particular form of it.

A like defect meets us in the account given in the verses ascribed to Orpheus.

The soul, it is there said, enters from the universe, being carried inwards by the winds as animals are breathing.

Now this is impossible in the case of plants and also in the case of certain animals in so far as they are not known to breathe: but this the holders of this theory have failed to notice.

But though it be necessary to construct the soul out of the elements, there is no necessity to compose it out of all of them: one or the other of two contraries is sufficient to distinguish at once itself and its opposite.

Thus by means of the straight we judge both the straight line and the crooked, the rule being the standard of both, while the crooked on the other hand can act as standard neither to itself nor to its opposite the straight

A general diffusion throughout the universe is claimed by some writers for the soul: it was in fact possibly this view which led Thales to assert that everything was full of Gods.

This however is a theory which presents some difficulties.

Why is it, for instance, that the soul which is in the air or in the fire does not produce an animal organism, while it does so in those objects which are mixed and compound, and this too though such thinkers hold the soul dispersed within the former to be the superior?

With reference to which, we might further ask why it is that the soul in air is, as they hold, more excellent and more immortal than that amongst animals.

In two ways, in fact, their theory is inconsistent with itself and paradoxical.

To speak of fire or air as of an animal is rather paradoxical: to hold, on the other hand, that soul is present in them and yet not call them animals is inconsistent.

So again, the ground on which they conceive soul to be present in these elements is the opinion that the whole is homogeneous with its parts: and thus it is incumbent on them to say that the soul is of like kind with its parts, if it be by acquiring part of their environment that animals become possessed of soul.

If however the air when divided remains of one uniform kind, whereas the soul is (as they maintain) of different kinds, it is clear that some part of it will, some other will not, be present Either then the soul of living creatures must be throughout homogeneous, or soul cannot exist in every elemental part of the universe.

It is clear then from what has been said, that neither does cognition attach to the soul in consequence of its being composed of elements, nor can it be said with any appropriateness or truth that it is moved.

Knowledge however is a property of the soul, and so also is perception and opinion, and further appetite and volition and desire in general: and it is by the agency of the soul that animals possess local movement and powers of growth, and reach their full development and final dissolution.

The question therefore rises, whether it is to the whole of the soul that each of these belongs, and whether we think and perceive and in general perform each of our functions, active and passive, with the whole of it, or, on the contrary, do we perform different functions with different parts.

And as for life likewise we must ask whether it is contained in some one of these parts or in several of them, or whether it may be even in all of them, or whether it is something else which is its cause.

There are indeed some thinkers, who assert that the soul is divided into parts, and that it reasons with one part, desires with another part.

But what, we may then ask, is it, if the soul be originally and naturally divided — what is it that holds the soul together?

It cannot certainly be the body: on the contrary, the soul would generally be said to unite the body; at least when the soul has made its exit from it, the body is dissolved and rots.

If then it be something else that makes it one, this something else could only be the soul; and as to that something else it will be needful in turn to inquire, whether it is one or made of many parts.

If it be one, why should not the soul be this unity at once?

if divided, reason will again inquire what it is that binds it together: and so the process will go on for ever.

Questions might be raised also about the different parts of soul, and we might ask what power is it that each exercises in the body: for if the soul as one whole unites the body as a whole, it is probable that each also of the parts unites and binds some portion of the body.

This however seems impossible: it is difficult even to imagine what part reason will connect, or in what manner it will do so.

Plants furthermore are found to live after they have been divided, and so also among animals are some insects — a fact implying that their different parts possess a soul which, if not numerically one, is still specifically the same: each at any rate of the separate parts possesses sensation, and displays a power of local movement for some time.

That they do not continue to do so, is no matter for surprise, because the parts in question do not possess such organs as will maintain their nature.

None the less, all the parts of soul are present in each one of these parts, and they are homogeneous with one another and with the soul taken as a whole, standing to one another as inseparable but to the whole soul as though it were divisible.

Further also, the principle of life in plants seems to be a kind of soul: for this alone is common at once to animals and plants, and while it can itself exist separate from the principle of sense, there is still no living object that can possess sensitive capacities without having this capacity of growth which plants display.